Advanced Caution and Warning System, Final Report - 2011 by Dalal, Mike et al.
March 2013
Advanced Caution and Warning System, Final Report — 2011
Lilly Spirkovska
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Gordon Aaseng
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
David Iverson
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Robert S. McCann
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Peter Robinson
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Gary Dittemore
Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
Sotirios Liolios
Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
NASA/TM-2013-216510
Vijay Baskaran
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Jeremy Johnson
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Charles Lee
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
John Ossenfort
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Mike Dalal
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Chuck Fry
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Larry Garner
Tietronix Software Inc.
Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20130012775 2019-08-31T00:47:44+00:00Z
•	 CONFERENCE	PUBLICATION.																						
Collects	papers	from	scientific	and																	
technical	conferences,	synopsia,	seminars,	or	
other		meetings	sponsored	or	co-sponsored	by	
NASA.
•	 SPECIAL	PUBLICATION.	Scientific,													
technical,	or	historical	information	from	
NASA	programs,	projects,	and	missions,	often				
concerned	with	subjects	having	substantial	
public	interest.
•	 TECHNICAL	TRANSLATION.	English-
language	translations	of	foreign	scientific	and	
technical	material	pertinent	to	NASA’s	mis-
sion.
Specialized	services	also	include	creating	
custom	thesauri,	building	customized	databases,	
and	organizing	and	publishing	research	results.
For	more	information	about	the	NASA	STI							
program,	see	the	following:
•	 Access	the	NASA	STI	program	home	page	at
							http://www.sti.nasa.gov
•	 E-mail	your	question	via	the	Internet	to
							help@sti.nasa.gov
•	 Fax	your	question	to	the	NASA	STI	Help	Desk
							at	(301)	621-0134
•	 Phone	the	NASA	STI	Help	Desk	at
							(301)	621-0390
•	 Write	to:
							NASA	STI	Help	Desk
							NASA	Center	for	AeroSpace	Information
							7115	Standard	Drive
							Hanover,	MD	21076-1320
Since	its	founding,	NASA	has	been	dedicated	to	the	
advancement	of	aeronautics	and	space	science.	The	
NASA	scientific	and	technical	information	(STI)	
program	plays	a	key	part	in	helping	NASA	maintain	
this	important	role.
The	NASA	STI	program	operates	under	the	
auspices	of	the	Agency	Chief	Information	Officer.	It	
collects,	organizes,		provides	for	archiving,	and	
disseminates	NASA’s	STI.	The	NASA	STI	pro-
gram	provides	access	to	the	NASA	Aeronautics	and	
Space	Database	and	its	public	interface,	the	NASA	
Technical	Report	Server,	thus	providing	one	of	the	
largest	collections	of	aeronautical	and	space	science	
STI	in	the	world.	Results	are	published	in	both	non-
NASA	channels	and	by	NASA	in	the	NASA	STI	
Report	Series,	which	includes	the	following	report	
types:
•	 TECHNICAL	PUBLICATION.	Reports	of			
completed	research		or	a	major	significant	
phase	of	research	that	present	the	results	of	
NASA		Programs	and	include	extensive	data	
or	theoretical	analysis.	Includes	compilations	
of	significant	scientific	and	technical	data	
and					information	deemed	to	be	of	continuing	
reference	value.	NASA	counter	part	of	peer-
reviewed	formal	professional	papers	but	has	
less	stringent	limitations	on	manuscript	length	
and	extent	of	graphic	presentations.
•	 TECHNICAL	MEMORANDUM.	Scientific	
and	technical	findings	that	are	preliminary	or	of	
specialized	interest,	e.g.,	quick	release	reports,	
working	papers,	and	bibliographies	that	contain	
minimal	annotation.	Does	not	contain	extensive	
analysis.	
•	 CONTRACTOR	REPORT.	Scientific	and				
technical	findings	by	NASA-sponsored														
contractors	and	grantees.
	
NASA STI Program... in Profile
March 2013
Advanced Caution and Warning System, Final Report — 2011
NASA/TM-2013-216510
National	Aeronautics	and
Space	Administration
Ames	Research	Center
Moffett	Field,	California,	94035-1000
Lilly Spirkovska
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Gordon Aaseng
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
David Iverson
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Robert S. McCann
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Peter Robinson
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Gary Dittemore
Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
Sotirios Liolios
Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
Vijay Baskaran
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Jeremy Johnson
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Charles Lee
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
John Ossenfort
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Mike Dalal
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Chuck Fry
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc.
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Larry Garner
Tietronix Software Inc.
Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
	 	 	 	 	 Available	from:
NASA	Center	for	Aerospace	Information	 	 	 National	Technical	Information	Service
7115	Standard	Drive	 	 	 	 	 5285	Port	Royal	Road
Hanover,	MD	21076-1320		 	 	 	 Springfield.	VA	22161
443-757-5802	 	 	 	 	 	 703-487-4650
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
1 
 
 
For the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration 
Program,  
Autonomous Systems and Avionics Project, 
Integrated Systems Health Management Task – 
 
Advanced Caution and Warning System (ACAWS)  
 
Lilly Spirkovska, Gordon Aaseng, David Iverson, Robert S. McCann, 
Peter Robinson 
NASA Ames Research Center 
 
Gary Dittemore, Sotirios Liolios 
NASA Johnson Space Center  
 
Vijay Baskaran, Jeremy Johnson, Charles Lee and John Ossenfort 
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc. at NASA Ames Research Center 
 
Mike Dalal, Chuck Fry 
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc. at NASA Ames Research Center 
 
Larry Garner 
Tietronix at NASA Johnson Space Center 
 
  
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
2 
Table of Contents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................ 3 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................................. 4 
PREAMBLE ................................................................................................................................................... 5 
1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................5 
2. GOAL AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................7 
3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ...........................................................................................................8 
4. ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................................................................9 
5. TASKS AND SCHEDULE ............................................................................................................... 10 
6. SHIELD/ANOMALY DETECTION .................................................................................................. 12 
INVESTIGATIVE DOMAIN ............................................................................................................................... 12 
USER INTERFACE ......................................................................................................................................... 13 
RESULTS .................................................................................................................................................... 15 
7. SHIELD/DIAGNOSIS+PROCEDURES ............................................................................................. 16 
INVESTIGATIVE DOMAIN ............................................................................................................................... 16 
DEMONSTRATION SCENARIOS ....................................................................................................................... 18 
DEMONSTRATION MODEL ............................................................................................................................ 19 
DEMONSTRATION DIAGNOSTIC MODEL AND EXECUTIVE .................................................................................... 21 
DEMONSTRATION PROCEDURES ..................................................................................................................... 24 
USER INTERFACE ......................................................................................................................................... 25 
User Interface Design Considerations ................................................................................................ 29 
DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION ..................................................................................................................... 31 
Evaluation Methodology .................................................................................................................... 31 
8. RESULTS .................................................................................................................................... 32 
DIAGNOSIS+PROCEDURE .............................................................................................................................. 33 
Diagnostic Results and Correctness Assessment ................................................................................ 33 
Summary of Findings .......................................................................................................................... 34 
Synchronization and Timing ............................................................................................................... 34 
Data Anomalies .................................................................................................................................. 35 
Inconsistent Transition Performance.................................................................................................. 36 
Diagnosis Method .............................................................................................................................. 36 
Procedures .......................................................................................................................................... 38 
User Opinions ..................................................................................................................................... 39 
9. LESSONS LEARNED .................................................................................................................... 42 
APPENDIX A: ACAWS TEAM ........................................................................................................................ 48 
APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST ......................................................................................................................... 50 
APPENDIX C: DIAGNOSTIC AND REPAIR PROCEDURES ........................................................................................ 51 
APPENDIX D: TEAMS DIAGNOSTIC MODEL ..................................................................................................... 62 
 
  
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
3 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: SHIELD system diagram. .............................................................................................................. 10 
Figure 2: Anomaly detection display formats. Upper left display shows a meter for the 
instantaneous value of the composite deviation score. Upper right display shows 
meters for the instantaneous values of each of the parameters being monitored. The 
meters are arranged to parallel the clockwise arrangement of HDU segments A 
through H with two temperatures per segment. We also added a time-of-day 
parameter to accommodate possibly different behavior during day and night 
operations. The bottom display graphically shows deviation scores over time arranged 
as in the meters display. ........................................................................................................................ 14 
Figure 3: This display shows the subfloor temperatures in graphic and tabular formats. ... 15 
Figure 4: PDU B/1 power string. .................................................................................................................. 18 
Figure 5: Demonstration TEAMS model.................................................................................................... 21 
Figure 6: HDU and SHIELD software communication architecture. .............................................. 25 
Figure 7: ACAWS (generic) user interface framework. ....................................................................... 26 
Figure 8: HDU system health annunciators. ............................................................................................ 27 
Figure 9: HDU diagnosis shown with tree display. ............................................................................... 27 
Figure 10: Procedure display. ....................................................................................................................... 28 
Figure 11: HDU block diagram display. ..................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 12: HDU sensor display. .................................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 13: Power Subsystem ......................................................................................................................... 62 
Figure 14: Avionics Subsystem ..................................................................................................................... 64 
Figure 15: Communication Subsystem ...................................................................................................... 70 
Figure 16: Environmental Control and Monitoring .............................................................................. 77 
Figure 17: Crew Accommodations .............................................................................................................. 80 
Figure 18: In scenario 2, 24 VDC Power Supply cannot be isolated as the fault without 
manual observation (test result). Red arrow points to that component in the suspect 
list. .................................................................................................................................................................. 83 
Figure 19: In Scenario 2, failure is correctly isolated to 24 VDC Power Supply using manual 
observation procedure “Check 24 VDC LED light” (see arrows in diagram). ................... 84 
  
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
4 
List of Tables 
Table 1: SHIELD operation locations. ............................................................................................................ 8 
Table 2: SHIELD schedule ............................................................................................................................... 11 
Table 3: Diagnosis Summary ......................................................................................................................... 33 
  
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
5 
For the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration 
Program,  
Autonomous Systems and Avionics Project, 
Integrated Systems Health Management Task –  
Advanced Caution and Warning System (ACAWS) 
Preamble 
This is a living document. As the team learns about the problem(s) and corresponding 
solution(s), the document will be amended. We aim to maintain knowledge not only of 
what works well, but also of what did not work or did not pan out as expected. The reader 
will notice that the sentence tense changes from future to past as the document proceeds. 
This provides an account of what was planned versus what was accomplished. 
1. Introduction 
The Advanced Caution and Warning System (ACAWS) is a fault management tool that 
combines dynamic and interactive graphical representations of spacecraft systems, 
systems modeling, automated diagnostic analysis and root cause identification, system and 
mission impact assessment, procedure and flight rule (FR) identification, and interaction 
with other tools to help spacecraft operators (both flight controllers and crew) understand 
and respond to anomalies more effectively. Each of these capabilities provides critical 
support in monitoring the performance of vehicle systems as well as supporting the real-
time decision process of MCC flight controllers and crew in connection with dealing with 
spacecraft anomalies and failures. In addition to real-time mission support, ACAWS’ 
capability to create and interact with malfunction scenarios will support the analysis and 
training tasks associated with spacecraft operations. 
 
The goals of the ACAWS project are: 
 To develop the technologies to support vehicle operators as they plan for, train for, 
and fly a spacecraft mission.  
 To develop an infrastructure that allows reuse and integration of multiple products, 
enabling the operator to focus on accomplishing mission tasks with minimal need of 
managing multiple software tools. 
 To understand what the operators’ needs are, what and how existing MCC tools can 
be integrated, what Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) technology can 
be used as is and what needs to be extended to meet the operators’ needs, what is an 
effective concept of operations that incorporates IVHM technologies, etc. The 
product of the project is not just a prototype system, but the associated lessons 
learned in developing it. Although the project cannot necessarily drive a standard 
format for any future spacecraft program(s), the project can demonstrate the 
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benefits of specific formats and, more importantly, demonstrate the benefits of 
having standard data sets that can be reused across multiple projects of a program. 
The focus of ACAWS is on the needs of both flight controllers and onboard crew. Although 
we expect flight controllers to continue to assist a crew in low-Earth orbit in dealing with 
system malfunctions, for future deep-space missions, the crew will need to accomplish 
some tasks autonomously due to communication time delays. We expect that providing 
similar tools – albeit perhaps with a different level of detail and different display formats or 
interaction methods – to the flight controllers and the crew could enable more effective and 
efficient collaboration as well as heightened situational awareness. In the remainder of this 
report, operators are used to refer to either flight controllers or crew. 
The work described in this report is a continuation of the ACAWS work funded in fiscal 
year (FY) 2010 under the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP), 
Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) project. In FY 2010, we developed 
requirements for an ACAWS system and vetted the requirements with potential users via a 
concept demonstration system.  
 
In FY 2011, we developed a working prototype of aspects of that concept, with 
placeholders for technologies to be fully developed in future phases of the project. The 
objective is to develop general capability to assist operators with system health monitoring 
and failure diagnosis. Moreover, ACAWS was integrated with the Discrete Controls (DC) 
task of the Autonomous Systems and Avionics (ASA) project. The primary objective of DC is 
to demonstrate an electronic and interactive procedure display environment and multiple 
levels of automation (automatic execution by computer, execution by computer if the 
operator consents, and manual execution by the operator).  
 
The integrated team, known as System Health and Impact Evaluation for Decision-making 
(SHIELD), conducted a combined demonstration and evaluation of system health 
management on the Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) at the Desert Research and 
Technology Studies (D-RATS) in the Arizona high desert on August 23 – September 14, 
2011. The integration of ACAWS and DC was demonstrated by ACAWS recommending 
malfunction (troubleshooting and recovery) procedures to the operator, who was then able 
to interact with those procedures using DC’s procedure display. In a system without an 
adequate distribution of telemetered sensors to fully disambiguate the cause of failures, 
other forms of observations are needed to isolate to a proximate cause. To further 
disambiguate diagnoses, some of the recommended procedures served to guide the 
operator in providing these additional observations about the system to the diagnosis 
engine. We refer to this as guided troubleshooting. Other procedures were recommended to 
restore functionality. Through this partnership, SHIELD developed and demonstrated 
technologies needed for anomaly detection, fault diagnosis, and fault recovery. 
 
We refer the reader to the FY 2010 ACAWS final report for information about the 
background, requirements, and general approach. In this report, we focus primarily on new 
developments. We begin by describing the integrated objectives of SHIELD. We do not 
discuss DC technology in much depth, but only describe aspects directly relevant to 
ACAWS. 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
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2. Goal and Objectives 
The goal of SHIELD is to mature ISHM and DC technologies that will enable deep space 
missions. These technologies, as stated previously, were demonstrated on the HDU as part 
of D-RATS 2011. The expected results of the experiment included the following: 
1. Enhanced and new ISHM/DC capabilities developed, guided by DSH needs and 
constrained by DSH capabilities 
2. User evaluations of the approach and information presentation concepts, leading to 
requirements vetting and generation of additional requirements 
3. Lessons learned regarding capabilities maturation for anomaly detection, diagnosis, 
health management situation awareness presentations, procedure generation and 
interaction, and diagnosis-informed discrete controls. 
4. Concepts of operation of ISHM/DC systems for deep space missions 
 
The objectives of SHIELD address aspects of the well-known spacecraft flight control 
approach of FIW: Failure, Impact, and Workaround. The FIW aspect addressed by each 
objective is highlighted in the following list: 
1. Mature anomaly detection (AD) capabilities  [F I W] 
a. Develop a general capability (an AD executive) to use ARC-developed 
Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) with systems that transition through 
multiple operating phases, utilize multiple IMS knowledge bases (KBs) per 
operating phase, and continue monitoring even when some incoming data is 
invalid or explicitly bypassed by an operator 
b. Develop tools and methods to enable an operator (domain system expert, but 
not IMS expert) to develop and update KBs in situ. Requires developing 
methods/procedures for remotely guiding training process and tools to 
facilitate the process. 
c. Evaluate effectiveness of IMS for fleet supportability tasks 
d. Develop methods to present IMS results to operator & evaluate UI design and 
perceived benefits to operator situational awareness (SA) 
2. Mature diagnostic capabilities [F I W] 
a. Develop a general architecture that utilizes Qualtech Systems Inc. (QSI) 
TEAMS-RDS for diagnostics 
b. Develop and evaluate effective (that is, SA-improving), usable, operationally 
beneficial and efficient methods to present diagnoses to operators 
3. Mature information presentation and interaction methods that help an operator 
maintain SA of system health and system operations [F I W]; this is being 
accomplished via objectives #1-d and #2-b. Evaluate different levels of 
presentation: quick-glance, SA-focused iPad displays & extended analysis-capable 
console displays 
4. Mature methods to assist operators with failure recovery [F I W] 
a. Develop and demonstrate a concept and methods for integrating diagnosis 
information with procedures 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
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b. Expand procedure display capability to facilitate operator’s interaction with 
procedure navigation and execution with varied levels of automation (LoA) 
c. Develop tools and methods to facilitate resolution of malfunctions 
unforeseen by operations personnel, i.e., for a novel set of failures for which 
malfunction procedures have not been worked out in advance 
i. Determine how to assist operator with authoring procedures by 
utilizing diagnostic models and exploiting diagnostic tree (QSI’s 
TEAMATE-like) functionality 
ii. Develop information presentation and interaction methods for 
presenting TEAMS/TEAMATE information to operator and attaining 
results of operator-performed system observations 
d. Enhance procedure authoring & execution by proposing and evaluating new 
approaches for treatment of LoA 
 
This is a rather extensive and ambitious set of objectives for a limited duration and DSH 
infrastructure that will continue to undergo its own development until its transport to AZ. 
We will develop the SHIELD system utilizing agile development methods, starting with core 
functionality and enhancing functionality as time allows. Some objectives will not be met. 
 
3. Concept of Operations 
SHIELD will run in multiple locations and will be getting either real-time data or delayed 
data, depending on location. A delay of 50 seconds each way is being artificially introduced 
for D-RATS 2011 to simulate and evaluate operations in deep space. SHIELD locations and 
the corresponding data update rate are shown in the following matrix: 
 
Table 1: SHIELD operation locations. 
Location Data (& results) update 
rate 
DSH Real-time 
On-site back room (“control tent”) Real-time & delayed1 
Remote MCC @ JSC (“MCC-H”) Delayed 
Remote test support room (TBD) 
(JSC/N220)2 
Delayed (TBD) 
 
There will be three independent parts of SHIELD at D-RATS 2011: anomaly detection (AD), 
procedures, and integrated diagnosis plus procedures. Each of the parts will be integrated 
with the HDU and will be available to the crew in the DSH, controllers in MCC-H, and test 
support staff in the control tent. 
                                                        
1 Not available, due to decision external to SHIELD. 
2 JSC decision was made to not have a remote test support team due to resources shortage, 
primarily personnel and equipment. 
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SHIELD/AD will run continuously and will be focused on monitoring the conditions in the 
subfloor area (where the computers are housed). SHIELD/AD will provide the deviation 
from nominal operating conditions, as learned automatically from archived data sets.  As an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of SHIELD/AD for fleet supportability, AD will be trained on 
archived data before the DSH leaves JSC; its performance will then be monitored when set 
up in AZ using these same knowledge bases. Any deviations may reflect inconsistent 
assembly, transportation-induced problems, or just environmental differences. AD will 
then be retrained on nominal operating behavior in situ for a revised baseline. 
 
SHIELD/Procedures subsystem will be available continuously and will run on-demand, 
with the operator selecting a procedure to display and execute from a table of contents. 
Procedure authoring will also be available on site (both in AZ and at JSC) for creation of 
new procedures or modification of existing procedures. SHIELD/Procedures will provide 
an electronic and interactive procedure display environment and multiple levels of 
automation (automatic execution by computer, execution by computer if the operator 
consents, and manual execution by the operator).  
 
SHIELD/Diagnosis+procedures subsystem will run as a demonstration, primarily for 
concept evaluation purposes. A subset of the power system will be modeled and multiple 
(independent and not concurrent) failures will be introduced (seeded with minimal 
interference to other on-going experiments). An operator will interact with 
SHIELD/Diagnosis+procedures to determine the cause of failure, execute troubleshooting 
procedures to disambiguate a diagnosis if necessary, and execute recovery procedures to 
restore HDU system functionality. Controllers in MCC-H will be able to follow along but 
with a 50 seconds delay. Following each scenario, operators (crew and controllers) will be 
interviewed for opinions and improvement suggestions.  
 
All data and results will be archived for post-experiment analysis. 
 
4. Architecture 
SHIELD is a system of systems, as shown in Figure 1. It is being developed to provide 
general capability, with minimal code specific to the DSH or the demonstration subsystem 
selected. For the DSH demonstration, SHIELD will run on Linux laptops; the SA displays will 
also run on Apple iPad tablet computers. Communication of data between systems will 
utilize ICE (Internet Communication Engine), an object-oriented middleware. 
 
The ISHM/ACAWS portion consists of COTS tool QSI’s TEAMS-RDS, NASA/ARC tool IMS, 
NASA’s JMEWS3 software, ACAWS graphical user interface (GUI), and supporting 
                                                        
3 JMEWS – Java Mission Evaluation Workstation System – is a tool prepared for NASA/JSC 
and used in the ISS MER (Mission Evaluation Room, the backroom support for ISS mission 
controllers). 
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infrastructure code. Development is in Java and C++ and will run on Linux OS, though it will 
be portable to various operating systems. 
 
The DC portion consists of the Procedure Display (PD), the Universal Executive (UE), and 
the Level of Automation (LoA) server. 
 
A simulator of the DSH, to be developed by the HDU team to assist with testing 
DSH/Avionics, was to be used for testing SHIELD. Simulator fidelity was to vary depending 
on the DSH subsystem being simulated, with some fairly accurate simulations and others 
non-existent. Unfortunately, the simulator was not developed as planned. As stated below, 
we tested, as much as possible, with an alternate approach that used playback of logged 
HDU operations. 
  
 
Figure 1: SHIELD system diagram. 
5. Tasks and Schedule 
The following lists provide a high-level description of the tasks to be accomplished, with 
the enumeration biased toward the ACAWS tasks, with DC tasks listed only when directly 
relevant to ACAWS. 
 
Software Development  
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
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Task #1. Anomaly detection executive development 
Task #2. AD knowledge base development 
Task #3. Diagnosis executive development 
Task #4. Diagnostic model development 
Task #5. Guided troubleshooting development 
Task #6. AD GUI development 
Task #7. ACAWS GUI development 
Task #8. iPad GUI development 
Task #9. PD GUI enhancement 
Task #10. UE/LoA enhancement and updates for new PRIDE version 
Task #11. Communication middleware refactoring 
 
 
System integration  
Task #1. Procedure recommendation handshake between ACAWS & PD 
Task #2. Guided troubleshooting handshake between ACAWS & PD 
Task #3. AD/ACAWS/PD GUI integration with DSH (via ICE middleware) 
Task #4. AD/Diagnosis executive integration with DSH 
Task #5. Test with DSH hardware in the loop 
 
Field Preparation 
Task #1. Diagnosis demonstration scenario development 
Task #2. Prepare computing resources for field operations 
Task #3. Train AD on nominal operating behavior at JSC 
Task #4. Training curriculum development 
Task #5. Operator training 
Task #6. Evaluation approach and questionnaires development 
Task #7. Demonstration scenario procedure development 
Task #8. Get SHIELD experiment on D-RATS timeline 
 
Field Experiment 
Task #1. Test with DSH hardware in the field 
Task #2. Update AD knowledge bases, as required 
Task #3. Conduct demonstrations & evaluations 
 
Wrap Up 
Task #1. Data analysis 
Task #2. Final report 
 
A general schedule for SHIELD is provided in the following table: 
 
Table 2: SHIELD schedule 
Task Time period 
Software Development Oct. 2010 – June 2011 
System Integration July 2011 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
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Field Preparation July 2011 – Aug. 15, 2011 
Field Experiment Aug. 23 – Sept. 14 
Wrap Up Sept. 14 – Sept. 30 
 
6. SHIELD/Anomaly Detection 
Investigative Domain 
We developed a general capability for anomaly detection (AD) using the Inductive 
Monitoring System, IMS. An AD executive system manages connection to the 
communication middleware (ICE) to retrieve the real-time telemetry, selects the 
appropriate knowledge base (KB) for a given operating phase, marshals the data into the 
appropriate vector, sends it to IMS, and posts the IMS deviation scores for the composite 
vector and each parameter individually back to ICE. Through ACAWS, we developed an 
extended capability to enable the AD executive to transition through multiple operating 
phases, utilize multiple IMS knowledge bases (KBs) per operating phase, and continue 
monitoring even when some incoming data is invalid or explicitly bypassed by an operator. 
 
The AD system was demonstrated at D-RATS by monitoring the conditions in the HDU 
subfloor area. The monitoring continued throughout the field experiment and displays 
were available to the HDU controllers (in the control tent) and to the operator during in-
the-HDU demonstrations. 
 
The subfloor has 24 sensor values (from 21 sensors) sent through either the wireless 
network system or through a wired connection. AD is agnostic to transmission path 
because all telemetry goes through ICE. With guidance from a subsystem expert, we 
selected 20 sensor values to monitor, as follows:  
 16 thermocouple sensors sensing temperatures throughout the subfloor area (2 per 
segment with the HDU logically separated into 8 segments) 
 A humidity sensor that senses both humidity and temperature 
 An airflow sensor that senses both airflow and temperature 
Four sensor values were omitted, as follows, because they are not sensing the overall 
environment in the subfloor: 
 An airflow sensor, sensing airflow and temperature of the airlock 
 2 thermocouples sensing temperatures on a specific electronics box. 
The humidity sensor, providing both humidity and temperature readings, was omitted once 
we arrived in the field. The sensor was initially associated with an RIU that was mistakenly 
omitted from the HDU avionics software build. After a few days of troubleshooting, the 
HDU team decided to re-associate that sensor with a different RIU. IMS requires a full 
vector of values for training data so the choice was to either disregard all otherwise-valid 
data already captured or disregard that sensor. We chose the latter option primarily 
because we had already exceeded approximately 30% of our field test duration. 
 
In anticipation of possibly different nominal operating behavior during day or night 
operations, we added a computed parameter for time since midnight. Thus, the training 
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vector was composed of the instantaneous values of each monitored parameter and the 
time of day. 
 
Training data for the 2011 HDU was not available during development of ACAWS. We 
therefore relied on data collected from the 2010 HDU. Three days of nominal operating 
behavior was available. This would be adequate to capture operating behavior only if there 
is very little variability between different operating days or conditions. Still, it provided an 
opportunity to begin the process of developing a KB with the expectation that further 
tuning would occur using 2011 HDU data, both from integrated tests while the HDU was 
still at JSC and from data captured once the hardware/software was transported to and 
installed in the field. We also had access of three days of off-nominal operating behavior 
that we could use for testing the knowledge base. 
 
It was hoped that additional training data would be available during integration testing at 
JSC. HDU hardware and avionics integration problems resulted in a very short duration of 
nominal HDU operations. We were therefore unable to compare the operating behavior of 
the 2010 HDU configuration to the 2011 configuration, eliminating an ACAWS objective of 
evaluating the effectiveness of IMS for fleet supportability tasks. 
 
User Interface 
IMS deviation scores are presented to the operator on three display formats, each with a 
different level of detail, as shown in Figure 2. The sensor data is also available to the 
operator in an integrated display format, providing both tabular display and graph display, 
as shown in Figure 3. The display formats are developed using the JMEWS software 
developed for JSC and used by controllers in the support rooms for ISS operations.  
 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
14 
 
Figure 2: Anomaly detection display formats. Upper left display shows a meter for the instantaneous value of the 
composite deviation score. Upper right display shows meters for the instantaneous values of each of the 
parameters being monitored. The meters are arranged to parallel the clockwise arrangement of HDU segments 
A through H with two temperatures per segment. We also added a time-of-day parameter to accommodate 
possibly different behavior during day and night operations. The bottom display graphically shows deviation 
scores over time arranged as in the meters display. 
 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
15 
 
Figure 3: This display shows the subfloor temperatures in graphic and tabular formats. 
 
Results 
The AD-related goal for SHIELD, as stated in Section 2, was to mature anomaly detection by 
developing a general AD executive for IMS, developing tools and methods to enable an 
operator to develop and update KBs in situ, evaluating the effectiveness of IMS for fleet 
supportability tasks, developing methods to present IMS results to an operator, and 
evaluating the UI design and perceived benefits to operator situational awareness (SA). As 
anticipated (see Section 2), we did not accomplish each of these tasks. Nevertheless, we 
made big strides toward them. 
 
We developed a general AD executive that facilitates use of IMS with systems that 
transition through multiple operating phases, utilize multiple IMS knowledge bases (KBs) 
per operating phase, and continue monitoring even when some incoming data is invalid or 
explicitly bypassed by an operator. Because these capabilities were not necessary for the 
HDU, they were instead verified on a Space Shuttle LH2 fuel loading operation 
demonstration in April 2011.  
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of IMS for fleet supportability, we planned to train IMS on 
nominal operations data while at JSC and then compare HDU operating behavior in the 
field. Unfortunately, due to HDU hardware/software integration issues prior to transport to 
the field, the final HDU configuration was reached a few days after its arrival in the field. 
Since the before-transport configuration differed from the in-the-field configuration, a 
comparison with IMS would have been meaningless. Thus, it was not possible to meet this 
objective. 
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Once HDU configuration was stabilized, we determined that subfloor temperature nominal 
behavior is very steady and, thus, not much nominal data is needed to train IMS. The 
temperature sensors were not calibrated, resulting in readings from two adjacent sensors 
differing by ~ 15 deg C. This was not a factor for IMS since it looks only for differences in 
nominal behavior rather than specific values. 
 
We detected the first failure – a WSN failure -- with IMS on the first day after we trained it 
on a few hours of the previous day's nominal data. We continued to detect subsequent (and 
frequent) WSN failures. 
 
IMS also detected rising temperatures (at one point, it was 4 degrees in 15 minutes) in the 
computer area in the afternoons. The HDU team decided that should be considered 
nominal. 
 
Each day, IMS was retrained, incrementally adding the previous day’s nominal data to the 
training set. Because no operators were available to train on how to do this, the team did 
the training. Still, the process was refined; we expect training non-experts to perform the 
operation will not be too challenging. 
 
Because of its usefulness in detecting WSN failures, the field controllers found AD valuable 
as AD was typically the first to determine that a failure had occurred. AD was also 
demonstrated to the operator/evaluators. The results of the evaluations are discussed in 
the User Opinion section below.  
 
7. SHIELD/Diagnosis+Procedures 
Investigative Domain 
Developing a diagnostic model for the full HDU is out of scope for this project. To select a 
reasonable subset of the system for demonstration purposes, we considered a number of 
characteristics for a reasonable investigative domain. First, the diagnosis of selected failure 
scenarios needs to be complex, both in the failure and the annunciation of the failure. Some 
desirable characteristics of such a failure include the following:  
 Requires substantial system knowledge to perform manually  
 Has a failure signature that looks similar to the signature of other possible 
failures, thereby providing a potential ambiguity of which failure happened 
 Requires analysis to determine the failure, but is not so complex that it is 
difficult to explain in a demonstration presentation 
 
Second, the selected subsystem needs to have enough sensors to allow for automated 
diagnosis. We wanted at least three scenarios to demonstrate different aspects of the 
technology, as specified below:  
1. An unambiguous diagnosis for which a recovery procedure would restore 
functionality.  
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2. An ambiguous diagnosis with a small group of possible failures that are explained by 
the telemetered data. This would lead to a malfunction procedure that would 
require operator observations to be input to TEAMS to further disambiguate to the 
actual (seeded) failure. At that point, a recovery-type malfunction procedure could 
be invoked. 
3. An ambiguous diagnosis that resembled an “unanticipated” failure. The ambiguity 
group, that is, the group of potential diagnoses that explain the failure signature, 
would be disambiguated via guided troubleshooting, with TEAMS suggesting the 
next-best observation for the operator to perform until either the diagnosis 
becomes unambiguous or there are no more operator observables that would help 
with disambiguation. 
Since this year’s HDU field tests (other than SHIELD) focused on nominal operations, each 
of the recovery and troubleshooting procedures would be generated by the SHIELD project. 
 
The last consideration for investigative domain selection was criticality of the (seeded) 
failure. To be part of the integrated operations test, the given ground rule from HDU was 
that a seeded SHIELD failure would not cause field exercise work stoppage; any non-
SHIELD planned operations must continue during a SHIELD demonstration. Further, we 
wanted a failure that requires immediate resolution. This would ensure that the crew 
would exercise ACAWS in an on-board capacity rather than deferring the problem to an 
MCC controller. 
 
With these objectives in mind, we selected a subset of the power subsystem, specifically a 
failure of the power distribution unit (PDU) that provides power to the wireless sensor 
nodes (WSN) and solid-state light modules (SSLM; the overhead lights distributed 
throughout the HDU). The connectivity of PDU B/1 to other components is shown in Figure 
4. 
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Figure 4: PDU B/1 power string. 
A number of failures in this power string have similar signatures, leading to complexity in 
the failure and annunciation of the failure. For instance, it is not immediately obvious 
whether a failure is in the PDU itself, the 24 VDC converter, the 28 VDC converter, the cRIO, 
a single WSN, or an RIU (remote interface unit; software that reads and publishes WSN 
data). Further complexity arises because loss of power results in loss of data that is needed 
to determine system state. It requires both sensor data and operator input to diagnose 
failures. It includes both hardware failures and software failures, and the ability to 
differentiate between the two. For example, an RIU crash results in loss of data that could 
look much like a power or avionics component failure. Finally, the failures are each very 
significant but not catastrophic, and their impacts vary from fairly isolated to fairly broad.  
Demonstration Scenarios 
Five seeded failures were targeted for the demonstrations, addressing the objectives for 
three scenarios described earlier. In the simplest failure, a single WSN will be commanded 
to OFF. This will result in sensor data loss for up to 10 sensors. Not all sensors transmit at 
the same rate; thus, effects of each sensor drop out will be felt over a period of time. 
Depending on which WSN is selected, the failure may look like an RIU failure because both 
failures would show data drop out on several sensors. TEAMS will disambiguate between 
them by using RIU heartbeat data – present whenever an RIU is running. Impacts of a WSN 
failure are limited to loss of data on that node. 
 
For the second demonstration failure – ambiguous diagnosis with anticipated malfunction 
procedure, the 28 VDC converter will be commanded to OFF. This will cut the power to all 
WSN motes and some of the CO2 sensors. Sensor losses would appear over time (up to one 
minute) as the sensors are transmitted at various rates and not tightly synchronized 
between nodes. Also, software tests for data drop out require multiple misses to be 
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verified, so it could be a few minutes before a diagnosis stabilizes. The malfunction 
procedure will direct the operator to check the exterior spotlights, if able, to disambiguate 
between the two most likely suspects of 28 VDC converter and cRIO 9477 Control Card 
failure. 
 
For the third demonstration failure – ambiguous diagnosis with unanticipated malfunction 
procedure, the 24 VDC converter will be commanded OFF. As for the 28 VDC converter 
failure, many sensor losses would be annunciated over a period of a few minutes. The 
ambiguity for the cause of the failure is between the 24 VDC converter, a cRIO failure, and 
the 28 VDC converter. At this point, TEAMS will offer guided troubleshooting steps. Each 
step aims to most efficiently disambiguate between the failure suspect remaining in the 
ambiguity group. It selects the next best step (“test” in TEAMS parlance), using criteria such 
as most critical item to exonerate first, least expensive observation to perform, and 
availability of equipment to perform observation. TEAMS will initially disambiguate 
between the 28 VDC converter and the other two based on the exterior spotlights (as for 
the second demonstration). Once that is exonerated, disambiguating between the other two 
candidates will require going in the subfloor area.  
 
As stated for the third demonstration failure, a 24 VDC converter failure and cRIO failure 
have the same signature when considering only automated observations. To disambiguate 
between them, a manual observation is required. In particular, the operator must 
determine whether the 24VDC converter indicator light is ON. If so, the converter is 
operational and hence, the cRIO must be failed to explain the observations. If the indicator 
light is OFF, the converter has failed. The system impact from either failure is similar – the 
cRIO (either because of its own failure or the failure of the upstream power supply) control 
function that commands 28 VDC power switches closed is lost, resulting in loss of data on 
all nodes. Additionally, if the failure is the power supply, the cRIO is impacted. 
 
Finally, the fifth demonstration failure that can be used to illustrate ambiguous diagnosis 
with unanticipated malfunction procedure is a failure of one of the cRIO’s internal cards, 
specifically the power control card. The signature of this failure based on automated 
observations looks similar to a 28VDC converter failure in that all of the WSNs will lose 
power. The 24 VDC and cRIO are exonerated by 2 O2 sensors that are read by the cRIO but 
powered by a different power circuit. To disambiguate, the operator can turn on one of the 
spotlights that is powered by the 28VDC converter. If the spotlight is ON, the 28VDC 
converter is exonerated. If the spotlight is OFF, the cRIO power card is considered the 
failure. 
Demonstration Model 
The determination of diagnostic state for the ACAWS system was accomplished using QSI’s 
TEAMS-RT runtime diagnostic engine that relies upon the use of a dependency matrix (D-
matrix) compiled from a user-generated, domain-specific TEAMS Designer model. TEAMS-
RT is able to query that D-matrix in near real-time in order to determine the most likely 
candidates for a given set of failures. The TEAMS Designer model (see Figure 5) was 
modified from an earlier TEAMS model developed by NASA/JSC contractor Aaron Schram 
for the 2010 D-RATS campaign. The TEAMS model is developed from the schematics of the 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
20 
HDU and is partitioned hierarchically into seven subsystems: Power, Avionics, 
Communications, Geolab, Environmental Control and Monitoring, Crew Accommodations 
and Food Production.  A breakdown of the major subsystems can be found in Appendix D. 
 
The TEAMS model was modified from the 2010 D-RATS campaign to support the failures 
scenarios identified by the SHIELD team. Updates included: 
 Additional ports and failure modes for Power Distribution Unit (PDU) B-1 
 Added PDU B-1 electrical current (amperage) tests 
 Renamed and added components along power fault propagation paths to reflect the 
current architecture 
 Added various manual tests that were required to disambiguate failures 
 Changed TEAMS “functions” to support accurate D-matrix generation 
 Added cRIO and interfacing components along with failure modes and appropriate 
tests to reflect the current architecture 
 Added 82 sensors that are connected to the Wireless Sensor Nodes (WSN) 
 Updated the WSNs and added the corresponding tests 
 Modeled various components that provided crew accommodation 
 Updated the avionics fault propagation paths to reflect current configuration  
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Figure 5: Demonstration TEAMS model. 
 
Demonstration Diagnostic Model and Executive 
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The diagnostic executive portion of ACAWS is written in Java using Java Native Interface 
(JNI) to query TEAMS-RT utilizing the TEAMS-RT API. This “wrapper code” consists of both 
an input side to feed TEAMS-RT and an output side to take the returned TEAMS diagnosis 
and present it to the user in a useful way. On the input side, ACAWS takes outputs from the 
HDU system and translates them into pass/fail test results for TEAMS-RT to process. This 
interface needs to talk to the ICE middleware in order to retrieve the system outputs and 
also must talk to the TEAMS-RDS server in order to pass along the translated results. There 
are 4 main types of output coming from the HDU over the ICE middleware that need to be 
translated and passed to TEAMS: 
 
1. Pass/fail test results based on telemetered-sensor observations – In the HDU, 
elements called interfaces are responsible for publishing out telemetry values from 
the sensors. These interfaces can be either Remote Interface Units (RIUs) or system 
controllers, with at least one controller being active for a given subsystem at any one 
time. Sensor values collected at various points in the system are transmitted by these 
interfaces over the ICE middleware. For the purpose of the ACAWS GUI, those sensor 
values can be displayed as-is to the user to give insight into the operating conditions 
of the HDU. For TEAMS-RT however, the sensor values must be compared with 
upper- or lower-bound limits or expected discrete state values and evaluated to 
either a pass or a fail result. These evaluations are performed at the subsystem level 
by the HDU system controller code and sent out over the ICE middleware, much like 
the telemetry data itself. This test result set can then be read by the ACAWS 
diagnostic executive and passed into TEAMS-RT via the TEAMS-RDS API. 
 
2. Telemetered-validity-based observations – Along with the sensor values being sent 
out by each interface over ICE, a validity flag for that sensor is sent in the same 
packet to denote whether the sensor value can be trusted. If, for instance, a WSN 
mote fails and all of the sensors attached to that mote go dead (i.e. - stop returning 
current values), the normal behavior of the RIU is to continue publishing the last 
known value for those sensors. To distinguish between a stale value that might 
represent a failed component and a 'good' value, the validity flag for that sensor 
value must be checked along with the value itself. Test points were added to the 
TEAMS model to represent these validity checks. If the flag is valid then the 
appropriate test is passed, otherwise the test is failed.  
 
3. Telemetered-heartbeat observations – The software running on each of the HDU 
interfaces is responsible for sending out a heartbeat message to the ICE middleware 
to indicate that it is healthy. In the case where an interface goes down due to 
software or hardware failure, a missing heartbeat message will alert the system that 
the interface is no longer working properly. The heartbeat message topic on ICE is 
subscribed to by ACAWS and associated with a watchdog timer. If the heartbeat 
message for any interface is not received in its expected time window, the associated 
test is failed in TEAMS-RT. 
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4. Procedure-driven observations - In addition to input sources from the HDU software, 
ACAWS also receives test results from the Procedure Display. As already discussed, 
the telemetered sensor observations are not sufficient for disambiguating most 
failures and, thus, operator-performed (“manual”) observations must be provided. 
This is accomplished via procedures, utilizing DC’s Procedure Display (PD). Each 
procedure is associated with manual tests in the TEAMS model. As the procedures 
are performed, the test results – provided by the operator – are sent to ICE. In much 
the same way that test results based on telemetry are passed in, the PD-based results 
must be mapped in the ACAWS executive to the proper TEAMS index and passed into 
TEAMS-RDS. For more information on the procedures see Appendix C: Diagnostic 
and Repair Procedures. 
 
All of the test results above are subscribed to via ICE middleware and added to test result 
arrays for TEAMS-RT processing. There are several implementation aspects involved in 
formatting and buffering those arrays before passing them to TEAMS, however. Much of 
this work was done because of timing issues in the HDU telemetry stream. In particular, the 
lack of framing and synchronization in the HDU data posed some challenges when 
designing the diagnostic executive code. A description of the implementation and reasons 
behind it are summarized below: 
 
1. Buffering Pass/Fail/Unknown test results – TEAMS standard diagnosis (resulting in a 
list of “bad”, “suspect”, and “unknown” components) is computed based on a history 
of past test results. This alleviates issues with transients, where a single out-of-limit 
sensor reading, for example, could result in the assumption of the existence of a fault. 
TEAMS standard diagnosis uses a “wait and see” approach before concluding a fault 
exists and providing a diagnosis of the alleged fault. Unlike the standard diagnosis, 
however, TEAMS minimum diagnosis (resulting in a list of “minimal” and “residual” 
components) generates a new diagnosis for each set of data depending only on the 
data received at that iteration. Due to the distributed nature of the telemetry in 
which each HDU controller is responsible for publishing a subset of the sensor values 
in the system, a test result vector composed only of the most recent data received 
from any one controller is not sufficient to capture the entire current state of the 
system. The solution is to buffer the last known state of each test – whether pass, fail, 
or explicitly computed as “unknown” – on the executive side and pass a complete test 
result vector into TEAMS-RT at every iteration.  
 
2. Windowing of test result arrays – Another issue caused by the telemetry being 
published in subsets from each controller is that there are many more result sets 
being published than TEAMS-RDS can process in real time. The fastest rate at which 
TEAMS-RDS can return a diagnosis is approximately once per second. The ACAWS 
wrapper was processing on average around 15 messages per second from the HDU, 
of which anywhere from 2 to 6 of those were evaluated to Pass/Fail arrays for 
TEAMS-RT consumption. Compounding this issue is the fact that the ICE 
publish/subscribe middleware can sometimes be 'bursty' - not sending packets for a 
short period of time and then flooding the system in the span of less than a second in 
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an effort to catch up. During periods when the diagnosis is frequently changing, these 
factors can back up the processing and result in the diagnosis output falling out of 
synch with the current state of the system. The solution to this problem is another 
form of buffering, called windowing, wherein multiple test result arrays are 
combined and passed to TEAMS-RDS as a single array if they are received within a 
user-specified time-window. For the purpose of this demonstration we experimented 
with both 1-second and 2-second windows of data.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the ACAWS executive also subscribes to test results returned by the 
PD during execution of procedures recommended by ACAWS. The procedures generally fall 
into three categories: single-test troubleshooting procedures; multi-test, pre-generated 
troubleshooting (diagnostic or malfunction) procedures; and function recovery (repair) 
procedures.  
 
Troubleshooting procedures are recommended when TEAMS-RT is unable to diagnose the 
failure down to an unambiguous cause. Two forms of troubleshooting procedures were 
generated for the demonstration. We implemented two approaches for recommending 
single-test troubleshooting procedures: rule-based and model-based. 
 
but has determined that a manual test could be performed that may help to reduce the 
ambiguity set further. If the ambiguity is reduced to the point of determining a single 
probable cause then the procedure recommendation will try to find a recovery procedure 
to either repair or replace that failed component. The rule-based solution was generated by 
ACAWS team members based on accumulated expertise with the failure scenarios and with 
the HDU hardware. The model-based solution relies on the TEAMATE interface within 
TEAMS-RDS. By analyzing the current health state of the system components as reported 
by TEAMS-RT, TEAMATE is able to determine the next best test to perform in order to most 
efficiently disambiguate the failure. Some progress was made in integrating the TEAMATE 
functionality for this demonstration, but additional work is needed to understand its 
capability and have its recommendations reflect a domain expert’s recommendations. See 
the “lessons learned” section for more information. 
 
In regards to the output side of the ACAWS code, much of the information presentation was 
performed by the ACAWS user display discussed earlier. The separation of ACAWS GUI and 
ACAWS diagnostic execution was a design decision intended to modularize functionality. 
This division of functionality also allowed us to run multiple ACAWS displays while 
subscribing to the same diagnosis output, giving a singular, coherent view of the system to 
multiple operators. Both the minimal and standard diagnoses as well as the procedure 
recommendations were published to ICE from the ACAWS wrapper for consumption by the 
user interface. 
Demonstration Procedures 
As described in the previous sub-section, the demonstration scenarios require recovery 
and troubleshooting procedures. These procedures are written in the Procedure 
Representation Language (PRL) and authored in the Procedure Integrated Development 
Environment (PRIDE).  The Procedure Display (PD) is the graphical user interface for 
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viewing, selecting, and executing procedures. A detail hidden from the user, procedure 
execution is achieved by automatically translating PRL procedures into the Plan Execution 
Interchange Language (PLEXIL); this PLEXIL representation is executed by the Universal 
Executive (UE).   Level of Automation (LOA) for each procedure step and instruction is 
managed by a separate entity called the LOA server. PRL, PLEXIL, PRIDE, PD, UE, and LOA 
server, all components of the Discrete Controls project, are integrated to provide a capable 
procedure authoring and execution environment to the operator. ACAWS interacts only 
with the PD.   
 
ACAWS recommends procedures to the operator by posting an ICE middleware message to 
which the PD subscribes. If procedures contain steps that require operator observations 
(so-called “manual tests”), the PD presents the instruction to the operator and then 
provides the operator’s answer back to the ICE middleware for consumption by the 
diagnosis engine as just another test result. We make no distinction between sensor-based 
test results and operator-observation test results. Figure 6 illustrates the communication 
between the various SHIELD software and HDU software both in the HDU and at MCC. 
 
 
Figure 6: HDU and SHIELD software communication architecture. 
The malfunction procedures, prior to being represented in PRL, are shown in Appendix C. 
User Interface 
The ACAWS user interface for this fiscal year builds upon the UI concept demonstrated last 
fiscal year. The general framework for the interface is shown in Figure 7. One of the key 
objectives for the framework is providing flexibility to support the operator to work how 
she/he wants rather than dictating a certain approach. Each of the panels (e.g., diagram, 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
26 
system health annunciators, C/W msgs, etc.) is independent yet interaction with each panel 
is coordinated with the other panels, that is, a diagnosis component selected in the 
diagnosis panel also selects the components in that diagnosis on the diagram. A panel can 
be resized; moved to a different location within the window; “torn” off the main window 
into its own window and placed on the same display monitor or an adjacent monitor; 
hidden; or duplicated to contain another system health annunciator group, for instance. 
Multiple configurations of panels can be saved, allowing each operator to set up the panels 
as desired for different tasks. For example, an operator may have one panel configuration 
for monitoring that deemphasizes failure impact, procedures, and flight rules, a different 
configuration for analysis that focuses (and assigns more display real estate) on those 
panels. The goal for this year’s work with regard to the UI framework was to develop the 
general capability in Java, establishing the path for future integration with other MCC tools 
under development, such as MCT, or existing tools, such as MSK and RT-Plot. 
 
 
Figure 7: ACAWS (generic) user interface framework. 
 
Specific display formats that reside within the ACAWS framework were developed for the 
demonstration scenarios. A system health annunciator arrangement was specified by the 
MOD customer and is shown in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8: HDU system health annunciators. 
 
Diagnoses from TEAMS are being displayed in a tree format rather than long strings of 
names that are representative of the diagnostic model but do not necessarily match the 
operator’s mental model of the connectivity of the power subsystem.  An example of this 
display is shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: HDU diagnosis shown with tree display. 
 
For procedures, we integrated with the procedure display developed by the SHIELD 
Discrete Controls project. It too uses a similar framework of enabling the operator to 
configure the display format to suit individual needs. Although malfunction procedures are 
recommended by ACAWS, all interaction with procedures is via this Procedure Display 
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(PD), shown in Figure 10. Through the PD, the operator is able to provide system 
observations needed to disambiguate the cause of a failure. 
 
 
Figure 10: Procedure display. 
 
Two diagrams were developed specifically for the HDU power string investigative domain: 
a block diagram shown in Figure 11 illustrating connectivity of the components involved in 
the demonstration scenarios and a tabular sensor display shown in Figure 12 which 
resembles the tabular displays MCC operators are familiar with. In a departure from most 
current systems summary display design philosophies, our display deliberately blended 
components from different HDU systems (Power, Communication, etc.) in order to provide 
operators with a single display format that communicated functional connections between 
components, and a single, integrated source of information about the functioning of the 
diagnostic reasoner and the full constellation of failure impacts. 
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Figure 11: HDU block diagram display. 
 
 
Figure 12: HDU sensor display. 
 
User Interface Design Considerations 
The ACAWS GUI is developed in Java. Display screens are programmed in Java Swing, with 
some GWT components, and an open-source software package – MyDoggy – that provides 
window allocation and docking capabilities. Docking means that a window can be 
dragged/dropped on a “docked” location and stay there relative to other windows, where it will 
move, resize, etc. along with those windows. When it is undocked, the window can once again 
be manipulated individually. Some customized work has been done to add features such as 
saving the configuration of the working environment, docking multiple windows around a main 
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window, and partitioning different areas of windows to group them together.  The ACAWS GUI 
framework simplifies dynamic management of multiple working windows at run time.  The 
ACAWS GUI has multiple types of window panes to display different types of information with 
different kinds of user interaction. All types of windows panes are derived from the dockable 
framework so that all windows are dockable and manageable in the same fashion. 
 
Design of the ACAWS GUI is based on the Model View Controller (MVC) software 
architecture. The controllers manage the data aspect of the components, and are responsible for 
data retrieval, processing and mapping, and also accept the user’s inputs. The views are 
responsible for updating display panes and rendering the components. The views also respond to 
the controller’s requests.  The models hold data, control, view and auxiliary information 
together, to notify the view to update when the state or data changes. The purpose of using such 
an architecture is to separate the view from the model so they can independently change or be 
modified, in a one-to-many relationship. For example, when the model logic changes, the view 
part of the code doesn’t necessarily need to change. One model can have multiple views, which 
can help the user understand different aspects of the model. There are multiple types of window 
panes in the framework to display and take user action on different data types. Each of the 
window panes utilizes the MVC architecture. For example, the telemetry data provides sensor 
values that can be displayed on the sensor data pane. The same data can also be displayed on the 
block diagram but using a different view, in this case, just whether the data is available or 
missing, not the data’s value. One model with two views can be realized easily with this MVC 
architecture. 
 
A multithreading model is used in the ACAWS GUI implementation.  The ACAWS GUI 
connects to the communications middleware (the ICE messaging server) to get data from 
ACAWS; this data feeds in real time.  There are five data sets involved: HDU sensor readings, 
TEAMS diagnosis results, recommended procedures, repair procedures, and IMS cluster 
distances scores. ICE services the data feed using a publish/subscribe scheme. Each data feed is a 
topic, and the ACAWS GUI subscribes to each of the data streams by topic name. When data is 
available, the ICE server will call back to the client to send the data stream.  If all the data sets 
are available at the same time, all will be streamed to the ACAWS GUI concurrently. The 
multithreading model can prevent view updating “jitters” when all data streams flood in at same 
time and the controller requests all views to update at the same time. The jitter situation is 
especially bad when multiple window panes are on one dockable window and all panes are 
viewable. The use of multithreading can utilize multiple CPU time slots and run multiple 
requests in parallel, which increases performance and reduces problems of data lag or updating 
lag of the displays.  The multithreading model utilizes Java Threads and synchronizes using 
thread states of run, stop, and suspend. The CPU time allocation for each thread is done at the 
Java virtual machine level so that the ACAWS GUI does not need to concern itself with thread 
scheduling. 
 
Color coding, using the traditional caution and warning system off-nominal colors of yellow and 
red, was used on the annunciator panel and block diagram to communicate TEAMS-derived 
information to the operators.  Filled yellow components (Figure 8 and Figure 11) corresponded 
to system elements that were currently in the TEAMS suspect list, meaning a failure of the 
colored component was consistent with (could have produced) the current pattern of test passes, 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
31 
fails, and unknowns. A filled red component corresponded to an element deemed  “BAD”, i.e., 
certainly failed.  Once an element was deemed “BAD”, downstream components that are 
currently deemed nonoperative due to the upstream failure were colored outline red, indicating 
the functional impacts of the upstream failure.  
 
On the sensors display, sensor values corresponding to missing data were replaced with cyan 
“M’’s. 
 
Demonstration Evaluation 
Three evaluators participated in the ACAWS evaluation.  Of the three, two were “field 
evaluations”, each featuring one operator/evaluator (hereafter, O/E), and each taking place 
on one each of two successive days at the D-RATS site.   Each of the two O/Es assumed the 
role of an on-site operator with full responsibility for diagnosing and working procedures 
for each of two malfunctions that were hand-injected into the HDU electrical power system 
by one of two confederates, both of whom were co-located with the O/E in the HDU. As the 
evaluations were not conducted under conditions where the O/E had complete capability 
to work all the manual procedures, the role of the other confederate was to provide the O/E 
the correct option to select from the pull-down menu of step-appropriate possibilities (e.g., 
if the step asked the operator whether a light came on in response to an earlier “Turn on 
light” command, the menu options were “Yes” or “No”).   
 
The third evaluator was located in the D-RATS MCC at NASA JSC.  The original plan was for 
this evaluator to be a passive observer of the ACAWS displays, similar to the ACAWS 
members in the onsite tent, except that telemetry transmission (and resulting display 
updates) would be delayed by 50 sec.  This plan was overtaken by events, however, when 
the ACAWS telemetry failed to transmit to MCC.  Accordingly, the MCC participant 
performed his evaluation “after the fact” using playback files, and was instructed to do his 
evaluation while applying the mindset that he was in fact “in the loop” on the day of the 
actual evaluations, but watching events unfold with a 50 sec delay. 
 
Evaluation Methodology 
 
Prior to participating in the actual evaluation, all three evaluators received approximately 
one hour of ACAWS training.  The goals of the training were threefold.  First, at the most 
general level, the evaluators were “coached” through a 28V DC power failure and the 
attendant ACAWS displays using PowerPoint slides. In this way, the evaluators were 
familiarized with the elements of the ACAWS display elements, the design philosophy 
behind the displays, the color-coding conventions used to communicate TEAMS diagnostic 
information, and the procedure recommendations from the TEAMS diagnostic reasoner to 
the operator.  The second training goal was to familiarize the evaluators with the standard 
set of windows icons that they could utilize to navigate between the ACAWS displays, resize 
the displays, and locate them on the screen according to user’s individual preferences. 
Finally, the third goal was to familiarize the evaluators with the set of design features (e.g., 
the focus bar, the window containing TEAMS-recommended procedures, etc.)  and the user 
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interfaces (e.g., pull-down menus, “Proceed” button, etc.) of the Procedure Display (PD) 
that enabled the evaluator to navigate through and complete a procedure. 
 
On each of the two test days, one of the two O/Es and the two ACAWS confederates took up 
residence in the HDU at the completion of that day’s scheduled integrated test activities.  
The test protocol, which took approximately one hour to complete, consisted of two EPS 
failure scenarios that were injected into the HDU electrical power system manually by one 
of the confederates.  The first failure produced an unambiguous signature that TEAMS was 
able to diagnose as a wireless system node (WSN) failure.  The second failure, a 24 VDC 
fault for O/E 1 (first testing day) and a cRIO card fault for O/E 2, produced an identical set 
of failure suspects that could only be disambiguated to the “parent” failure by providing 
TEAMS with the result of an additional manual test, part of the TEAMS-recommended 
procedure. Each O/E was initially expected to perform all the manual steps involved in the 
procedure.  For example, the disambiguating test for the 28V DC failure (the scenario used 
in practice) involved turning on a spotlight that was powered through the 24VDC line, and 
then visually checking the spotlight through a camera to determine whether the “turn on” 
command had succeeded (and the spotlight was in fact on). In order to make that 
assessment, the appropriate camera had to be located and slewed to an orientation that 
brought the spotlight into the camera’s field of view.  In the original plan, the O/E would 
have actually performed these actions using the dedicated camera display brought up on an 
iPad, one of a suite of non-ACAWS displays designed for D-RATS operators.  However, the 
HDU did not turn out to be configured to support these actions directly, so one of the 
confederates coached the O/E to advance through the manual procedures, and then 
whether he should select “Yes” or “No” on the pull-down menu in response to the step that 
asked the crucial question, e.g., “Is the cRIO LED indicator on” for the cRIO/24VDC failures, 
in order for TEAMS to disambiguate these failures. 
 
 Even with this assistance from the confederate, the O/E was responsible for diagnosing the 
source of the failure using the information provided on the ACAWS displays.  Following the 
completion of each of the steps on the PD, the O/E completed a questionnaire consisting of 
a workload rating (Bedford scale), and ratings of ACAWS display characteristics.  Following 
the completion of the procedures appropriate for the second failure, these scenario-specific 
questions were re-administered.  Finally, a more general set of ratings and questionnaires 
pertaining to the ACAWS displays were completed.  In addition to these quantifiable 
metrics, ample opportunities were provided for the O/E’s to give us more unstructured 
feedback (opinions) as to the content of the ACAWS displays, whether the level of 
integration between the ACAWS displays and the PD was sufficient, what kinds of 
additional capabilities the evaluators would like to see from ACAWS in future iterations, 
and so on.   
 
All evaluation results are presented and discussed in User Opinions section below. 
8. Results 
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Diagnosis+Procedure 
The diagnostic results from the ACAWS field trials were analyzed for correctness and 
effectiveness and a full report of the analysis is presented in a separate document. This 
report summarizes the diagnostic results as well as the key findings of the analysis. 
Diagnostic Results and Correctness Assessment 
The HDU model with HDU data produces correct diagnoses, either isolating to the correct 
inserted failure, or to an ambiguity group that includes the inserted failure. The reasons for 
an inability to resolve to a single component are understood and explained. The diagnostic 
results were accurate representations of the state of the HDU systems once the failures 
were fully elaborated. In all cases the correct diagnosis of the seeded failure was 
represented within the body of information. The Standard Diagnosis was very consistent 
and presented a correct diagnostic representation. The Minimal Diagnosis, which was used 
as the basis for information displays, was somewhat susceptible to perturbations from 
anomalies in the data. 
A summary of each scenario that was exercised in the field is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3: Diagnosis Summary 
Scen Failure Standard Diagnosis Minimal Diagnosis 
Bad Suspect Correctness Min Resid Correctness 
1 WSN-5 
0 9 
Correct ambiguity 
group; seeded 
failure is included 
in SUSPECT 
1 0 
Correct isolation 
to seeded failure. 
2 A 24 VDC 
Power 
Supply 
2 89 
Correct 
component in 
BAD, 1 sensor also 
in BAD 
Correct SUSPECT 
  
2 9 
Seeded failure in 
MIN, 1 sensor 
also in MIN 
RESID was not 
cleared 
2B 24 VDC 
Power 
Supply 
1 91 
Correct BAD 
Correct SUSPECT 1 0 
Seeded failure 
isolated as root 
cause 
3 9477 
Control 
Card 0 87 
Correct SUSPECT 
but incomplete 
resolution; 
additional manual 
tests needed. 
0 87 
Identical to Std 
4 cRIO 
10 79 
Seeded failure in 
BAD, plus 9 
sensors 
3 0 
Seeded failure in 
MIN, plus 2 
sensors 
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Correct SUSPECT 
set 
 
The diagnoses were consistent with the data and the model, and where the seeded failure 
was not isolated as the single failure, the causes for ambiguous information are explainable. 
In Scenario 2 a software modification after the evaluated test run provided a more correct 
diagnosis. In Scenario 3, an additional manual test that was not performed would have 
resolved the ambiguity. Scenario 4 was nearly correct but was affected by incomplete 
initialization after the previous scenario, but the displayed information was correct. 
Standard Diagnosis left large SUSPECT sets in addition to usually including the correct 
failure in the BAD set. An examination of the SUSPECT set shows that the components are 
justifiably included based on an assessment of the HDU system and the diagnostic 
algorithm. 
Summary of Findings 
The primary findings of the field exercise analysis are briefly summarized, and additional 
detail and explanation is provided in the following sections.  
 
 Finding 1 – Synchronization and timing of HDU data causes variability in the 
sequence and presentation of information during failure onset, but produces 
consistent final results. 
 Finding 2 – Frequent data anomalies including false INVALID indicators, false FAIL 
and false PASS results during failure onset, and false heartbeat FAIL tests result in 
intermittent false diagnostic results but in most cases the correct diagnosis is 
restored when the false test results are cleared. 
 Finding 3 – Inconsistent and invalid cRIO sensor value tests during failure onset 
affected the diagnosis in scenarios 2 and 4 when cRIO function was lost. 
 Finding 4 – The use of Minimal Diagnosis as primary display is useful when 
diagnosis resolves to a single root cause and the RESIDUAL set is cleared, but the 
RESIDUAL set as the basis for diagnostic display is less than satisfactory. The 
SUSPECT set from Standard Diagnosis is more stable. Further analysis is 
recommended for selection of diagnostic algorithm. 
Synchronization and Timing 
The HDU was developed as a concept demonstration system with subsystems that are 
generally representative of spacecraft. The HDU Avionics team made an architectural 
decision to use a loosely coupled data system without rigorous synchronization. Data 
cycles would be based on individual system clocks, without particular requirements for 
time synchronization, jitter or drift. Software applications would be responsible for 
controlling their execution cycles, and if the processors were busy when the application 
was ready to execute, delays were tolerated. The avionics team worked to keep processing 
times reasonably efficient and keep network bandwidth moderate. Rigorous control would 
have required a degree of design, development and analysis that the group could not attain 
with the limited budget and schedule available. A habitation system like the HDU does not 
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necessarily require a rigorously deterministic real-time controls system, since most 
response decisions can be made slowly, it was believed, and inconsistencies at the 
transitions can be tolerated. The architectural decisions were made after consideration of 
benefits and risks, and are not being second-guessed here. This type of system, however, 
provides additional challenges for an automated decision system, and these characteristics 
must be considered early in the architecture of the health management system. 
Humans are generally pretty good at recognizing when data comes in slightly out of 
sequence, and can mentally process the data to understand its meaning. Computer systems 
are dramatically inferior in making these types of judgments, and in the ACAWS project, 
integration and performance tuning were significantly affected by timing and sequencing 
inconsistencies in the HDU data. In model design, it was expected that when the failure 
occurred, all the data would arrive at least in sequence, if not precisely at the same time. In 
reality, failures on the HDU system develop over an extended period. From the first 
indication of failure to arrival of the last element of the failure signature could take up to 80 
seconds for the complex failures that involved many sensors at a mix of processing rates. 
These contradictions during failure onset must be expected and accommodated. ACAWS 
modelers did not have a good understanding of these types of issues at the start and 
struggled to accommodate them. 
One suggestion has been to develop a rigorous framing system that assures a consistent 
failure signature at all times. While this would certainly help solve this problem, it has a 
cost in complexity of development. Developing a framing application independently of the 
HDU may be feasible, but achieving determinism in the failure onset sequencing could be 
difficult, as the full range of the HDU performance in the absence of rigorous timing 
requirements is only roughly known and empirically observable. Building such a system 
based on observed behavior may not be satisfactory; even if the frequency of occurrence of 
contradictory failure signatures is reduced but not eliminated, the automated diagnosis and 
decision system must still be tolerant of deviations, or the operators must be tolerant of 
errors in the system. 
Data Anomalies 
Frequent data anomalies are present in the HDU data from various causes. The diagnoses 
depended on use of validity indicators in the data, which were based on a “staleness” 
algorithm, not a true validity check. HDU sensors are processed and reported at periodic 
intervals based on clocks in the data collection equipment, and processed at periodic rates 
by HDU software applications, but various clocks are not synchronized and there is no 
attempt to accurately frame the data. When a software RIU application reads sensor data, it 
checks to determine if new data has been written since it was last processed, and if the data 
is not fresh, it marks the data as INVALID. Variations in clock drift and process scheduling 
can cause data to be missed which results in false INVALID settings. These false failure 
indications occur somewhat regularly, with some sensors more susceptible than others. 
The PDU-B1 total current sensor, for example, has a false failure rate of approximately 17% 
in the September 4 data log, while the Bank 2 sensor has a false fail rate of about 3% and 
the Bank 1 sensor had no false fails. These randomly occurring false fails induce false 
diagnostic results that appear in the displays for a period, and then clear when the false 
fails clear. Because of the slow data rates that range from 10 seconds to 60 seconds, the 
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false fail tests result in diagnoses that can appear in the displays for up to a minute. The 
data latching that was done to work around some display and diagnostic concerns 
compounded the effects of false fail tests. 
Inconsistent Transition Performance 
One case was observed where variations in the test results during failure onset had an 
impact on the final diagnosis. The CO2 and O2 sensors attached to the cRIO were tested in 
two ways. The validity tests from the RIUs that processed the cRIO data were set to VALID 
if the cRIO transmitted any data, and were INVALID if no new data had been obtained from 
the cRIO. A different test was performed by the HDU Software Controller application on the 
value of the sensors. This test was intended to detect a non-functioning or malfunctioning 
sensor by testing for large negative values that were far outside of normal operating range 
of the sensor. However, when the cRIO failed, the sensor value tests were expected to 
produce an UNKNOWN result because the Controller checks the Validity Indicator before 
performing the test. However, during failure transition the Validity Indicator was not set to 
INVALID for one or two cycles of the SW Controller, resulting in false test results published 
by the SW Controller. In 7 of 8 of these tests the results were always FAIL results, but the 
Airlock O2 sensor test varied between PASS and FAIL from different test runs, and flipped 
between PASS and FAIL in at least one case during the transition. These test results were 
passed to the diagnostic reasoner and caused a slightly different ambiguity group as a 
result. When all the tests were FAIL, the cRIO 9219 Card was implicated as a BAD 
component; when one test was PASS, the 9219 Card was not implicated and instead the 
sensors that reported FAIL sensor value tests were diagnosed as BAD. The variability in the 
B1 O2 sensor had an effect on the displayed state of the 9219 Card that was confusing to 
operators and was not easily explainable. 
Results varied between the three test runs in which cRIO functionality was lost. Two runs 
of Scenario 2 were conducted on 9/4 in which 24 VDC Power Supply failure resulted in loss 
of cRIO function, and one run of Scenario 4 on 9/5 where a cRIO failure was induced. The 
diagnosis of the 9219 Card varied between these three based at least in part on the random 
variability of the test results on the cRIO sensor values. A means of suppressing the false 
test results after cRIO function is lost would have eliminated all of these effects and made 
for a more accurate diagnosis especially in the transition states. 
Diagnosis Method 
The QSI TEAMS-RT tool includes two diagnostic algorithms, Standard Diagnosis and 
Minimal Diagnosis. The ACAWS team has considered both, and decided to use the Minimal 
Diagnosis as the basis for displays. The ACAWS project has provided a substantial body of 
data that can be used to make a much more complete and analytical assessment of the 
preferred diagnosis method. Further analysis using the data from HDU failure scenarios is 
strongly recommended for future health management projects. 
Standard Diagnosis uses a Multiple Fault Assumption in which diagnosis is done without 
making any assumptions about probabilities. In the HDU scenarios, failures of individual 
components are considered as likely as a higher-level component failure that caused the 
test failures. For example, if 10 sensors on a WSN report test failures at the same time, the 
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Standard Diagnosis algorithm assumes that each of the 10 sensors may have failed and that 
the WSN has also failed. 
Minimal Diagnosis uses a generalized Single Fault Assumption that tries to find common 
cause for the test failures, and if a single failure can explain all of the test results, then only 
the common explanation is displayed. In the WSN example above, Minimal Diagnosis 
concluded that the WSN has failed and the sensors have not failed. 
QSI describes the Minimal Diagnosis as: 
“The Minimal Fault Assumption is a generalization of single fault assumption – it is 
the minimum number of failures that explain the signature (i.e., Pass/fail results). 
No enumeration/evaluation of failure combinations are done as that will be NP-
hard. 
The biggest difference between single fault assumption and minimal fault diagnosis 
is that under single fault assumption, when a test fails, all faults that the test does 
not detect has to be declared GOOD! That is a hugely optimistic step – most people 
do not realize it – but that’s what single fault assumption means.” 
The cascading failures typical of power and instrumentation systems that the ACAWS team 
selected for diagnostic scenarios generate lots of downstream effects, and it seemed that 
Standard Diagnosis would generate large ambiguity groups that experience or intuition 
would conclude could not be the explanation. In some scenarios there are 80 sensors, 
several Wireless Sensor Nodes, power supplies, junction boxes, and avionics components 
that are affected by power failures. It would not be reasonable to believe that a possible 
explanation for the failure signature is that all of those components failed, independently, 
at the same time. It was expected that Minimal Diagnosis would do a better job of 
identifying the best explanation of the failures. 
The scenarios that were selected are characterized by a loss of visibility into system state 
due to the loss of power. The diagnosis uses the loss of visibility as the primary symptoms 
of the failure, but using loss of information as the diagnostic cues presents some challenges. 
The HDU does not have redundant power or instrumentation systems that could provide 
confirming indications of failure. There is power system instrumentation at the PDU level, 
but no instrumentation of power beyond the PDU in the DC power systems. Because of the 
sparseness of direct sensory indications of failure, the Minimal Diagnosis appeared to be a 
favorable diagnostic algorithm. 
This decision warrants further consideration. The Minimal Diagnosis algorithm is not as 
mature and robust as the Standard Diagnosis, it appears; QSI has cautioned against over-
reliance on it. It is more of a spot-check algorithm without (or less, maybe) use of prior 
diagnostic history and memory of prior tests, so is more susceptible to data anomalies such 
as occasional false failures which the HDU data is prone to generate. On detailed 
examination of the diagnostic results, it does not appear to be as effective as expected in 
thinning the diagnostic results compared to the Standard Diagnostic algorithm. 
On the plus side, the Minimal Diagnosis was effective at identifying the actual failure and 
clearing the SUSPECT set from the Standard Diagnosis. When the disambiguating manual 
procedures were performed, a single component could be displayed from Minimal 
Diagnosis, since the RESIDUAL diagnosis was either cleared or substantially reduced. In 
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Standard Diagnosis even when the seeded failure was identified as a BAD component, the 
SUSPECT set remained large. 
However, the Minimal Diagnosis is affected by conditions not directly related to the 
diagnosis. For example, the effect of occasional data dropouts had a somewhat surprising 
effect on the Minimal Diagnosis. During the HDU tests, an unexplained loss of data for about 
a minute occurred on two occasions. The dropout occurred when the seeded failure was 
fully elaborated and stable, and a stable diagnosis would be expected. When the dropout 
occurred, the software heartbeat tests failed, and the diagnosis correctly identified the 
software applications as having failed, placing them in the BAD and MINIMUM diagnosis 
sets. However, when these were added to the MINIMUM set, all of the components in the 
RESIDUAL set were cleared. When the data resumed, the heartbeats reported PASS results 
and the RESIDUAL set returned to the original state before the data dropout. The Standard 
Diagnosis was not affected by the data dropout, other than to add the software modules to 
the BAD set, and clear them when data resumed. Using the RESIDUAL data as part of the 
display results in information changes that are not explained by the condition of the actual 
failure. 
This is by no means a complete analysis and comparison of the two algorithms. It does 
indicate that such an analysis should be conducted in future projects. It may be that both 
are useful algorithms and can contribute to a mature diagnostic display. The Standard 
Algorithm is perhaps a more pessimistic one, and the Minimal Diagnosis is more optimistic. 
An ability to mode switch between them could be useful, although it would require a more 
nuanced understanding of the reasoners to determine when one or the other is more 
appropriate. 
Additional collaboration with QSI is recommended both to more fully understand the two 
algorithms, and to possibly refine and mature the Minimal Diagnosis algorithm. 
Procedures 
Currently procedures for the HDU are written offline, i.e. they are authored and validated in 
advance of their usage in mission operations.  Support for dynamic in-situ procedure 
authoring and modification exists but needs further refinement and testing before actual 
use. Procedure validation of a static nature is currently performed in the PRIDE authoring 
tool, which checks procedure content against the HDU system model (represented in XTCE) 
as the procedure is entered; violations are immediately reported.  Dynamic verification of 
procedures is also achievable in PRIDE by running them against a state machine 
representation of the HDU; this is not currently performed due to insufficient development 
of the needed state machine representation. 
 
All procedures written for the HDU field test proved to be effective in accomplishing their 
goals.  We note that the repair, malfunction, and manual observation procedures were 
almost completely manual procedures, i.e. containing instructions that had to be carried 
out by a human.  Because these manual steps were well known in advance, the procedures 
had high likelihood of succeeding.  Some automation, in the form of automated 
commanding and telemetry checks, was added to several repair procedures for the final 
live HDU test, and the automated execution was also successful. 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
39 
User Opinions 
Field Operators.  When considering the feedback provided by the two ACAWS O/Es, it is 
important to note their divergent backgrounds: O/E 1 is an advanced systems development 
engineer and D-RATS operations manager, while O/E 2 was a former mission control 
console operator. In addition, the two O/Es completed their evaluations under different 
circumstances.  On day 1, TEAMS encountered difficulties disambiguating the suspect list, 
so even after the second failure was disambiguated to the parent problem (24 VDC failure), 
a list of residual suspects remained.  On day 2, software improvements allowed the TEAMS 
System Display to eliminate the residual suspects, showing (correctly) only the parent 
failure (cRIO card) in filled red.  As we will see shortly, O/E 2 returned consistently higher 
(“better”) values with respect to subjective evaluations of the ACAWS displays and specific 
elements thereof than O/E 1. With the background of the O/E’s fully confounded with these 
test protocol differences, it is not clear whether to attribute this systematic result to 
occupational background differences, the different conditions at test, or even just to 
random (and expected) differences in how individuals interpret and fill out Likert and 
Workload scales (for instance, individuals often bring different thresholds and preferences 
for selecting extreme values close to the anchor points on the scales to their evaluations). 
Therefore, our analysis of user feedback will focus for the most part on general trends 
rather than individual differences. 
 
Workload. On both malfunctions, workload was judged as a “2” or “3” on the Bedford scale, 
with the exception that O/E 2 selected numbers closer to the middle of the scale for the 
isolation and recovery stage.  Overall, therefore, the O/Es self-rated their workload as fairly 
light, with plenty of spare capacity to deal with additional tasks if they had to, at least 
during the diagnostic phase.  There was some indication that more attention was required, 
and there was less capability to deal with additional tasks, while working task isolation and 
recovery procedures. The MCC console evaluator (hereafter, “C/E”) did not rate his 
workload. 
 
Information Display.  Following each scenario, all evaluators were asked to choose a value 
between 1 and 10 that corresponded to their assessment of how timely the display of 
information was on the ACAWS displays, how well the information depicted system state, 
how well the information supported a quick and rapid assessment of the malfunction, how 
well the displayed information enhanced their decision-making capabilities, and how well 
the display of information helped them complete the necessary procedures.  The results for 
most questions were generally in the high 7-10 range, indicating quite positive 
assessments.  A notable exception was that O/E 1 gave a “5” (Scenario 1) and “6” (Scenario 
2) to the question about how well the displays enhanced decision-making capabilities.  This 
relatively low assessment probably reflects the problems with ACAWS information 
presentation for O/E 1 compared to O/E 2.  At a minimum, the data point to the importance 
of unambiguous color-coding on the ACAWS displays for operator usage. All but one rating 
(by the C/E) were 7’s. 
 
Ease of Processing/Ease of Operation.  As a corollary to the Information Display-related 
questions, which tied operator’s performance to the information on the displays 
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themselves, evaluators were also asked a series of more general situation awareness-
related and display-usage questions, such as, on a 10-point Likert scale where zero was 
very easy and 10 was very hard, how easy was it to understand the source of the problem, 
and to engage in activities such as locating the appropriate information on the ACAWS 
displays and working the malfunction.  Again, the responses by the two O/Es clustered in 
the low end of the scale, with an overall average across eight individual ratings (four for 
each scenario) of 1.75.  Consistent with the results from the other assessments, the trend 
was for Scenario One to be rated easier to deal with than Scenario 2, and O/E 2 rated the 
scenarios as easier than O/E 1. The average of the C/E’s ratings was 2.25, also well toward 
the “Very Easy” side of the scale.       
 
Display Format Features.  Following the completion of the two scenarios, evaluators were 
asked to rate, on a 10-point Likert scale with 0 being “Not at all Favorable” and 10 being 
“Very Favorable”, three general questions concerning the ACAWS block diagram display.  
The questions were all related to the overall issue of how well the “show the intra and 
inter-systems connections” philosophy that was the primary driver behind the design of 
the block diagram display “went over” with the O/Es.  In general, the O/Es gave quite 
favorable feedback with all responses on the “Very Favorable” side of the scale, and an 
average rating over the six total responses (three questions, two O/Es) of 7.8.  Once again, 
the ratings were slightly but consistently lower for O/E 1 than for O/E 2. Ratings by the C/E 
averaged just under 7, also comfortably in the “favorable” range. 
 
A second series of questions concerned the usefulness of specific features of the block 
diagram display on a 10-point Likert rating scale with 0 being “Not at all Useful” and 10 
being “Very Useful”.  A key was presented in the upper right-hand corner of the display to 
give “at a glance” information concerning coding conventions adopted for the display, such 
as the fact that connections were solid lines when depicting power buses between system 
components, long dashed lines for data buses, and short dashed lines for commanding 
buses.  One O/E declined to rate this feature; the other rated the usefulness as 8.75, close to 
the top of the scale; the C/E returned a slightly less favorable rating of 6.75.  Turning to the 
more general question of how intuitive the ACAWS color coding conventions were in and of 
themselves, on a scale of 0 (Not at all intuitive) to 10 (Very intuitive), O/E 2 though the 
coding was a highly intuitive 8.75; O/E 1 and the C/E rated the coding as just slightly less 
intuitive, giving it a 7.25.  In general, then, both the overall design format and several 
specific features of the block diagram were well received by all three evaluators. 
 
Other displays.   O/E 2 rated the usefulness of the two remaining ACAWS displays 
(annunciator panel, sensor) as 8.75 out of 10.  Continuing the trend from other questions 
and other evaluations, O/E 1 was somewhat less charitable, giving the annunciator panel a 
(still positive) 6.25, and the sensor panel at 7.75.  Both O/Es rated the windows-related 
ability to re-arrange and resize the displays at close to the top of the usefulness range; 8.75 
in both cases.  With regard to specific design features, the focus bar received a rating of 
8.75 by both O/Es on the usefulness scale.  On the other two features, the small magenta 
position bar and the pull-down menus for user inputs, O/E 1 again rated the magenta 
position bar as less useful than O/E 2; both thought the pull-down menus for 
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communicating the results of user actions to the PD were quite useful (8.75 and 8.25, 
respectively, for O/Es 2 and 1). For his part, the C/E rated the annunciator panel, the 
schematic display, and the ability to rearrange the panels to suit his individual preference 
all above 7.0 on the usefulness.  However, in a sharp departure from the O/Es, the C/E only 
gave the sensor display a 3.75 rating, and called the display not very useful in his comments 
section.  He thought that the display layout overemphasized WSN sensor data to the 
detriment of the other sensors depicted in the block diagram display. 
 
Interestingly, both O/Es had additional comments on what additional features they would 
like to see in a PD. (The C/E did not see this display, and did not provide PD-related input.)   
O/E 1 wanted the steps to be numbered; O/E 2 suggested a time stamp on recommended 
procedures, possibly as a tie-in between the PD and the astronaut’s activities timeline.  An 
ability for the operator to clear and/or delete procedures and a list of recently completed 
procedures and status in table form were also suggested. 
 
Integration of PD and Block Diagram Displays.  The ACAWS developers had a particular 
interest in getting more information from the evaluators concerning the degree of 
integration that was built in between the PD and the Block Diagram. We have implemented 
various concepts in the past that feature more integration than in the current ACAWS 
concept, where integration was limited to the ACAWS displays recommending procedures, 
and the PD containing a window featuring the same list of recommended procedures.  Here 
the interesting result was an interesting dissociation between the views of O/E 1 and 2.  In 
a deviation from the normal pattern, where O/E 1 yielded lower ratings than O/E 2, O/E 1 
rated the current level of integration between the two displays as higher on the “0 equals 
insufficient and 10 equals sufficient” scale than O/E 2.  Consistent with that assessment, 
O/E 1 chose a value on the negative side (4.25) of the scale in response to the question 
“How useful do you think it would be to try and combine PD information with system 
status and failure impact information on the same display”, whereas O/E 2 though it would 
be very useful (rating of 9.75).  This was by far the biggest dissociation in ratings between 
the two O/Es, and was reinforced by O/E 1’s comment that “Care should be taken when 
trying to integrate procedures too closely with other failure data”.  By contrast, O/E 2 
suggested grouping procedures by subsystem.  
 
Additional Features and Capabilities.  All three evaluators were asked how desirable it 
would be to add the following elements and capabilities to the ACAWS system: Impact 
assessments that included impacts on activity schedules and operator timelines, 
automated, real-time procedure generation, a natural language-based interface for 
commanding, troubleshooting, and querying databases; and a prognostics (time-to failure) 
capability.  While O/E 2 consistently rated the desirability of these possibilities higher than 
O/E 1, they both rated them as quite desirable, with the lowest rating being a 7.25 from 
O/E 1. Similarly, the lowest value provided by the C/E was 7.75,  for the natural language 
interface. 
 
IMS Assessment.  O/E 1 and the C/E were not able to get exposure to the IMS displays 
during his evaluation period.  O/E 2 rated the IMS displays as a 7.75 out of ten on a rating 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
42 
of how useful he found IMS for maintaining situation awareness of the overall health and 
functioning of the subfloor area, 7.25 out of 10 for how intuitive he found the depiction of 
the aggregate deviation score, and 7.25 on a scale of 0 (Less Useful) to 10 (Much more 
useful) an aid to situation awareness that he found the depiction of the aggregate deviation 
score to be, compared to the standard depiction of individual sensor values color-coded for 
limit-sensing. 
 
Overall comments for additions to ACAWS.   O/E 1 suggested adding 
percentage/probability indicators to the suspect list and embedding the indicators in the 
block diagram alongside the yellow components.  O/E 2 suggested that ACAWS be able to 
generate a list of possible failures before any procedures are run to help situational 
awareness for operators. The C/E recommended larger console monitors, or multiple 
monitors, so all ACAWS displays could be in the field of view at once.  In addition, he 
thought that the displays need to have a clearer way of communicating TEAMS behavior 
and TEAMS classifications (i.e., what constitutes being part of an ambiguity group) during 
the time that a suspect group is being depicted (i.e., prior to declaring an element “BAD”).  
This led him to suggest that ACAWS should consider being more selective, such that not all 
failures and anomaly situations may require the information about them being filtered 
through an automated tool like TEAMS. 
 
C/E evaluation of time delay effects.  While viewing the ACAWS displays and watching 
them change as the failure was injected and TEAMS was processing the data and making its 
classifications, the C/E was asked to evaluate from the perspective of passively watching 
the situation unfold with a 50 sec time delay relative to the field. He deemed the questions 
N/A, however, citing the fact that he had no responsibility for working the HDU 
malfunctions and did not collaborate with the crew in any way.  As he stated, “Time delay 
will only have an impact to ops if the task is a critical task or if the crew does not know how 
to handle a situation.  Automation is needed in order to assist the crew with situations like 
this.”  
 
His assessment of, if he had had a role to play, what the impact of a 50 sec time delay on 
that role would have been, was in the “no discernable impact” range of the 10-point scale. 
 
9. Lessons Learned 
As with most endeavors, there is always room for improvement. In this section, we discuss 
some of what we learned that could benefit future projects.  
 
Development process: 
 Follow the agile development process as intended. Mini-deliverables along the way 
help determine whether adequate progress is being made toward the proposed 
deliverable. It helps ensure that the customers’ top priority requirements are met 
early in the process, allowing guidance toward what was really wanted, not just 
what they thought they wanted. It also allows the development team get to the 
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hurdles more quickly and have the time available to work out a method over the 
hurdle or transition toward a different solution before too much is “laid in stone.” 
 Integration planning. Didn’t plan sufficiently for how to test, other than hook up to 
HDU and run. The team struggled with lack of test tools throughout integration, 
cobbling together a playback feature late in the game. HDU Tester was OK for static 
interface testing but incapable of end-to-end scenarios that was desperately needed. 
Several issues encountered on the real hardware were impossible to re-create using 
the playback tools at hand. Development of a higher fidelity and complete 
simulation model to test against would have greatly facilitated code design and 
reduced stress. 
 Develop modules such that they can be thoroughly unit-tested, i.e. not highly 
dependent on completion of other modules. Have ICDs agreed upon early. 
 Select a system architect and development lead at the beginning of the project, 
someone who will coordinate and facilitate testing and integration through the final 
test. Ensure that person has the required skills to perform the task. 
 Acquire needed hardware and third party software, and have it set up, well in 
advance of the field test. Back-ordered hardware caused unnecessary work, 
especially when the effort of complicated software installs and licensing had 
to be duplicated on multiple machines and architectures. Do not assume that 
just because a software installation process was worked out on a similar 
computer/OS that it will work flawlessly on the target computers/OS. Do not 
put off that install and verification until the end of the development process; 
people will be too busy finishing up their tasks to support that task. 
 Customize the user environment(s) on the field test computers so that they are easy 
to use by all team members involved.  Ensure that all team members are part of the 
same permissions group and that the ”umask” is set appropriately to allow everyone 
access to code/data files.  
 Streamline the running of the project’s software. If multiple programs need to be 
started or a particular start sequence needs to be followed, that process should be 
simplified as much as possible, perhaps even fully scripted, and definitely fully 
documented so that everyone on the team can perform it.  
 Creation of a group account for the team would be useful in advance of the 
demonstration, and should be tested on all demonstration machines prior to the 
field test. This may not be allowed by security restrictions, however, so work-
arounds should be considered in advance of field testing. 
 Develop software, especially GUIs, on the target operating system (OS). Porting from 
a different OS adds tasks and even for software promoted as OS-independent, 
variations between OSs will occur. This is especially true for the GUI. The look and 
feel on a Windows computer can be very different than the look and feel on a Linux 
computer. Elements will need to be resized to look right on the screen – effort that 
could be used to develop additional functionality rather than redo work.  
 
 
Demonstration domain integration: 
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 If the demo domain hardware or software is not already fully developed, assume 
and plan for development of demo domain hardware and software needed for 
integration to slip. Develop as much technology that does not depend on the demo 
domain, i.e., the general functionality, as early as possible. Make assumptions about 
how things will eventually work in the demo domain hardware and avionics but 
frame those assumptions in the code so they are easily replaced. 
 If the demo domain hardware or software is still under development, get agreement 
on interfaces as early as possible. Make project requirements known to the demo 
domain hardware/software team as early as possible and work together toward 
reasonable solutions that address both team’s constraints. Case in point from this 
year’s effort was the misfit between our need for validity flags that provide 
information on whether a telemetry value should be trusted versus the avionics’ 
team implementation of a “freshness” flag that provides information on how 
recently the sensor was polled for a given telemetry item.  
 Chasing a moving target. The HDU was continually changing through integration. 
The first time ACAWS was ever run with a complete correct software load on the 
HDU was in the field demo. The lesson is not necessarily to avoid working with 
articles under development, but when doing so, planning needs to account for the 
churn. Test tools, expectation setting, using ACAWS as part of the design process all 
would have helped. 
 Schedule integration testing time with the demo domain hardware/software before 
the field experiment. There were many concurrent experiments at D-RATS that 
required a nominal HDU configuration and the support staff’s attention. Having to 
do integration testing under those circumstances was very difficult. Our scheduled 
integration testing slots were usurped by repairs that needed to be accomplished 
for the higher-priority “integrated test” happening the following day. Our slot was of 
limited duration, allowing for only a couple of trials per slot. Because HDU time was 
in short supply, we were limited to only two one-hour test slots. Given that the HDU 
avionics was not in the correct configuration during the first one-hour test, we were 
left with trying to test everything out in one hour with no retest time before the 
evaluation runs. 
 
Diagnosis: 
 Develop with the assumption that some hardware will be failed in the field. When 
designing demo scenarios, build enough of the surrounding foundation to ensure 
the scenarios are not too fragile and unable to be accomplished when associated 
components that are not part of the scenario fail as they inevitably will at the most 
inopportune time. 
 TEAMS’ Minimal Fault Assumption (“minimal diagnosis”) vs. Multiple Fault 
Assumption  (“standard diagnosis”) algorithms both have some strengths and 
weaknesses; we hypothesized that for the selected failures the Minimal Diagnosis 
would provide a better basis for display. The hypothesis was, at best, partially borne 
out.  
 TEAMS “minimal diagnosis” functionality works differently than intuition may 
suggest. In particular, when a few things could explain a test result signature, each 
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of these things is put in the “residual” list rather than listing these all as possibilities 
in the “minimal” list. For example, if component-1 failure or component-2 failure 
results in the same test result signature, the minimal list is empty and the residual 
list contains both component-1 and component-2.  
 TEAMS “minimal diagnosis” does not keep a history of test results. Standard 
diagnosis does keep a history. With history, TEAMS maintains its own view of the 
state of the system and its diagnosis is not quickly swayed by transient incoming 
test results. In order to provide TEAMS with an accurate view of the current state of 
the system, that capability must be reproduced in the diagnosis executive. Full 
vectors of test results must be passed in at each iteration. Conversely, when using 
“standard diagnosis,” only newly received test results need to be passed in since it 
maintains the previous values for any test results not passed in. 
 Timing and Synchronization. Diagnostics with non-real-time unframed data at 
multiple slow rates, and “ratty” data (frequent intermittent false test data) will 
result in a diagnosis that takes longer to reach a consistent state. While the 
challenges involved in programming to such a system add greatly to the body of 
“lessons learned”, the positive impact on observers and especially stakeholders is 
somewhat lessened. 
 Displays based on a worst-case initial assumption that is reduced over time, rather 
than building up to a diagnostic conclusion; e.g. if one sensor fails, the initial 
diagnosis is that it could be caused by anything from just the sensor all the way to a 
total power failure. This pessimistic view is sometimes at odds with the 
expectations of controllers used to more optimistic assumptions. 
 Testing Paradigm. The team made an early decision to use HDU controller tests as 
the primary basis for tests to TEAMS. The reality was that the tests that the 
controllers were able to perform were not sufficient for diagnosis. Validity and 
heartbeats were primary data for determining if sensors and other equipment were 
operating. When controller tests were used, they were frequently out of synch 
during transitions and resulted in misleading results. A test layer outside of the HDU 
core software could have more effectively managed validity and other testing issues; 
the “valid … static” not above is part of this topic. 
 Targeting diagnostic domains early. There are various flavors of diagnosis that can 
vary significantly in how to approach them. The power/instrumentation systems 
that were targeted relied heavily on sensor validity and software heartbeats, with 
only a few tests on telemetry values used. Software development had assumed a 
primary reliance on using tests on valid telemetry so some key software 
components were not even identified until late in the project. Other domains would 
presumably have quite different needs; ECLSS, with emphasis on fluids and 
chemistry; propulsion, characterized by high energy and rapid failure propagation. 
Understanding a targeted range of domains before completing the software 
architecture would have helped. 
  
 
Anomaly Detection: 
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 Given that we received a pseudo “freshness” / pseudo “validity” flag for each 
telemetry parameter, it would have been useful to include rate of change as a 
computed parameter in the monitored vector. 
 Developing the needed knowledge bases was quite easy. If data is available, the KB 
development tools make “cranking” out a KB and tuning it easy enough for the non-
expert. 
 
Procedures: 
 Author, verify, and validate procedures well in advance of the field test. 
 More study of the diagnostic model and its impact on the “Next Best Test” 
functionality. The recommendations provided by TEAMATE are based on diagnostic 
trees, but little to no time was spent evaluating these generated trees and their 
applicability for the demonstration scenarios. Completion of this work would have 
required either more time between model completion and demonstration or 
additional personnel. 
 
User Interface: 
 There was broad agreement on the part of the evaluators that a design philosophy 
for an ACAWS display that provided a graphical representation of inter-, as well as 
intra-systems connections between components that are impacted by a systems 
failure was a good design feature. This suggests that a scaled-up dynamic display 
generation capability that would produce a fault-management display for any 
arbitrary failure in any arbitrary system should be pursued.   
 The unanimous, highly favorable ratings of the desirability of all four suggested 
additions – incorporating crew activity schedules and timeline information into the 
ACAWS impact assessments; an automated, real-time procedure generation 
capability; natural-language based user interfaces; and a prognostics capability – 
should all be pursued. 
 There were consistent expressions of concern over the delays between the initial 
depiction of the suspect elements on the block diagram, and the final determination 
of which elements were failed and which were just impacts.  The ACAWS displays 
clearly need to display more information to the user about what state the 
automation is in; how “certain” the automation is that the current depiction is the 
“final answer”, whether the diagnosis process is continuing and the user should 
“stand by” while more test data comes in and is processed, etc.  Another approach to 
this problem is to go back to the telemetry generation process and impose top-down 
requirements for telemetry update rates that are standardized across sensors and 
command and data-handling systems hardware.   In addition, smarter diagnosis 
executive algorithms need to be written to implement a user-centered filtering 
scheme, where transient sensor dropouts and the like, and the immediate TEAMS 
response, is withheld from the displays (or, at least, the TEAMS online derivation of 
BAD and SUSPECT elements is inhibited). 
 An important lesson learned stems from the disagreement between the O/Es 
concerning the value of pursuing design options for ACAWS displays that more 
closely integrated the procedure display and block diagrams.  The difference in 
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opinion suggests that one suite of ACAWS displays may not fit all, and those with 
different roles to play in future missions (crew, flight controllers, multi-purpose 
support room [MPSR] personnel, etc) may benefit from customized design suites 
tailored to fit their particular information needs. 
 The feedback from the C/E about time delay indicates quite clearly that to be 
meaningful, a study of the effects and impact of time delay needs to incorporate an 
operational concept and a failure scenario that includes a meaningful role for the 
ground in cooperation with the crew. 
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Appendix A: ACAWS Team 
 
Management Team Role Affiliation 
David Alfano ASA Project Manager NASA ARC 
Mark Schwabacher IVHM Principal Investigator NASA ARC 
Alan Crocker ACAWS Task Customer NASA JSC 
 
 
ACAWS 
Development Team 
ACAWS Role Affiliation 
Gordon Aaseng Diagnostic models, scenarios, procedures NASA ARC @ JSC 
Vijay Baskaran Diagnostic executive, anomaly detection SGT @ NASA ARC 
Gary Dittemore MCC Domain expert, MOD customer NASA JSC 
David Iverson IMS models/consulting; HDU failure 
injection 
NASA ARC 
Jeremy Johnson Diagnostic models SGT @ NASA ARC 
Charles Lee User interface  SGT @ NASA ARC 
Sotirios Liolios MCC Domain expert, HDU Integrated Ops 
Manager, MOD customer 
NASA JSC 
Robert McCann User interface, scenarios, procedures  NASA ARC 
John Ossenfort Diagnostic executive SGT @ NASA ARC 
Peter Robinson Diagnostic models, data system, procedures NASA ARC 
Lilly Spirkovska Task lead, user interface, anomaly detection NASA ARC 
 
HDU / DC Team Role Affiliation 
Daniel Carrejo HDU, failure injection trainer NASA JSC 
Mike Dalal DC SGT @ NASA ARC 
Chuck Fry DC SGT @ NASA ARC 
Larry Garner HDU, DC, integration  Tietronix @ NASA 
JSC 
Matthew Hall HDU, iPad displays Tietronix @ NASA 
JSC 
Dennis Lawler HDU Avionics NASA JSC 
Thomas Matthews HDU, test result vectors NASA JSC 
Arthur Molin DC, test result vectors Tietronix @ NASA 
JSC 
Kristina Rojdev HDU, anomaly detection  Tietronix @ NASA 
JSC 
Craig Russell HDU, anomaly detection data Tietronix @ NASA 
JSC 
Lui Wang DC lead NASA JSC 
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TEAMS Team ACAWS Role Affiliation 
Somnath Deb TEAMS expert QSI 
Sudipto Ghoshal TEAMS expert QSI 
Deepak Haste TEAMS expert QSI 
Venkat Malepati TEAMS expert QSI 
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Appendix B: Acronym List 
 
ACAWS Advanced Caution and Warning System 
AMISS Anomaly Monitoring Inductive Software System (aka IMS outside JSC) 
API Application Programming Interface 
ARC NASA Ames Research Center 
C&W Caution and Warning 
C/E Controller / Evaluator 
CSV Comma Separated Values (common file format) 
CxPASS Constellation Procedures Application Software Suite 
DFT Design for Testability 
DTO Development Test Objective 
ELOG Event Logger 
EVA Extra Vehicular Activity 
FCT Flight Control Team 
FFA Functional Fault Analysis (Ares I TEAMS modeling and analysis effort) 
FN Flight Note 
FTT Full-task Trainer 
GMT Greenwich Mean Time (aka UTC) 
IMS Inductive Monitoring System (aka AMISS at JSC) 
ISP Information Sharing Protocol 
ISS International Space Station 
JSC NASA Johnson Space Center 
KSC NASA Kennedy Space Center 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit 
MCC Mission Control Center (JSC) 
MCT Mission Control Technologies 
MER Mission Evaluation Room 
MET Mission Elapsed Time 
MOD Mission Operations Directorate (JSC) 
O/E Operator / Evaluator 
PDU Power Distribution Unit 
PRACA Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
PTT Part-task Trainer 
QSI Qualtech Systems Inc. 
RIU Remote Interface Unit 
SITF Source-Independent Telemetry File 
TEAMS Testability Engineering and Maintenance System 
Unique-
identifier 
PUI, MSID, CUI, etc.; a method to associate a parameter/measurement with a unique name 
VV&A Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
WSN Wireless Sensor Node 
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Appendix C: Diagnostic and Repair Procedures 
 
The ACAWS project scenarios for the Desert RaTS exercise will use a set of procedures 
related to diagnosis of failure. Procedures include manual diagnostic tests that are needed 
to resolve diagnostic ambiguity and procedures for recovery of function once the necessary 
recovery actions are known, based on accurate diagnosis of failure. 
The first section – Scenario Procedures – describes the procedures for three defined 
scenarios. The scenarios are organized around closely related groups of failures, some with 
ambiguity when using only automated testing that is resolved with application of manual 
tests. 
The second section – Manual Diagnostic Test Procedures – lists a procedure that 
corresponds to each of the manual tests in the TEAMS diagnostic model. The Scenario 
Section refers to these manual tests as necessary to complete the scenario procedures. The 
procedure names in this section correspond to the TEAMS test names. 
Scenario Procedures 
Three scenarios are defined: 
 Scenario 1 – WSN Mote Failure. The failure is unambiguous and includes only a repair 
procedure 
 Scenario 2 – Loss of cRIO Functionality. Failure of a power supply or the cRIO box could cause 
the failure, and manual diagnostic steps are needed to resolve ambiguity. 
 Scenario 3 – Loss of 28 VDC equipment. The 28 VDC converter or a control card in the cRIO 
could cause the observable effects. Manual steps are required, and multiple repair procedures 
are included. 
Scenario 1 – WSN Mote Failure 
The scenario starts with a failure of a single Wireless Sensor Node (WSN). All sensors on 
the node stop reporting data, and software sets ‘invalid’ status on the telemetry. The 
diagnostic reasoner identifies the WSN node that has failed, and the failure is indicated on 
ACAWS displays. 
Repair Procedure 
1. Determine if the sensors on the WSN mote are required for continued operation 
 If YES, proceed to following steps 
 If NO, stop. 
2. Locate the failed node 
3. Turn the WSN Power Switch to OFF (middle position). 
4. Unplug the power cord from the WSN. 
5. Unplug the sensor terminals from the WSN. Check that the sensor terminals are 
labeled so they can be connected correctly on the new WSN. If labels are not 
present, apply tape to the sensor terminal wire and label it with the port number 
from which it was removed.  
6. Pull the WSN off the mounting bracket.  They are held in place via Velcro. 
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7. Obtain a replacement WSN from inventory. 
 A WSN can be replaced by a functionally equivalent node from a different 
manufacturer; a Nivis WSN could be replaced by a Dust WSN if necessary 
8. Place Velcro on the new WSN in the same location as the Velcro on the mounting 
bracket. 
9. Place the new WSN on the mounting bracket. 
10. Plug the sensor terminals into the new WSN.  Verify that the sensors are connected 
to the correct channels by checking the channel # and sensor name in the 
channelization table with what’s plugged in. 
11. Update the channelization/calibration tables so that measurements from sensors 
are correctly associated with and calibrated for the new node (specific steps are 
TBD) 
12. Plug in the power cord into the WSN. 
13. Flip the power switch to 28 VDC 
14. Wait for the node to join the network (~ 5 – 10 minutes) and verify that sensor data 
is being received by checking the data displays on the iPad and observing that 
correct sensor data is being received and no invalid data indications are present 
15. Checkout – confirm that the sensors are working 
 Use the ACAWS display and confirm that the previously failed WSN mote is 
not listed as a BAD or SUSPECT component and the ACAWS connectivity 
display shows the WSN with a white outline. Check the ACAWS WSN display 
and confirm that all sensor values are displayed with numeric values. Any 
values displayed in magenta or with an ‘M’ instead of a numeric value 
indicate invalid data. If all of the sensors are magenta or ‘M’ it indicates the 
WSN mote is not functioning. If some are displaying valid data in white text 
but one or more are in magenta (with ‘M’) it indicates that the indicated 
sensors were not plugged into the WSN mote correctly, or that the sensor 
itself has failed. In this case the ACAWS display should also list the affected 
sensors as BAD components. 
Scenario 2 – Loss of cRIO Functionality 
This scenario results in loss of cRIO functionality, either due to a 24 VDC Power Supply 
failure or a complete failure of the cRIO itself. The failure results in loss of power to WSN 
motes 1 – 11 and loss of all telemetry from the sensors on these nodes. In addition, six CO2 
sensors and 2 O2 sensors will stop reporting data. Validity status telemetry will indicate all 
of these sensors as ‘invalid’. Software control of Solid State Light Modules (SSLM) is lost 
also. Lights can still be controlled by manual switches on the lights, and lights remain in 
their current state at the time of the failure. 
 
The procedure must first resolve the ambiguity of the failure. Both the 24 VDC Power 
Supply and a failure of the cRIO appear identical to the automated diagnostic reasoner. The 
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failure is similar to a 28 VDC failure, the only difference is that with a 28 VDC failure there 
should be valid readings on two O2 sensors that the cRIO reads. TEAMS-RT diagnosis will 
not differentiate between these three failures, generating an ambiguity group consisting of 
the possible causes, and also listing many of the impacted components in a large SUSPECT 
set.  If the 24 VDC Power Supply is receiving power, but is not outputting 24 VDC power, 
then it can be concluded that the Power Supply is the failed component and the cRIO 
functionality is lost as an impact of the Power Supply. If the Power Supply can be shown to 
be generating power, then it can be concluded that the cRIO has failed internally. This 
procedure assumes that the PDU port is functioning and providing power to the power 
supply. 
Diagnostic Procedures 
1. Perform the 24VDC-PowerSupply-LED-Check procedure. 
 A FAIL result indicates that the Power Supply is bad. The operator will be 
directed to proceed with Repair Procedure – 24 VDC Power Supply. 
2. If the previous result is PASS, perform the cRIO-LED-Check procedure.  
  A FAIL result indicates that the cRIO box is bad. The operator will be 
directed to proceed with Repair Procedure – cRIO 
Repair Procedure – 24 VDC Power Supply 
1. Lift the floorboards in Segment A and locate the 24 VDC Power Supply 
2. Command power to PDU B1 Port 9 to OFF. 
 Assures that no voltage surges occur when removing or installing the new 
power supply. 
3. Unplug the power supply from the PDU. 
4. Disconnect the cRIO power input from the power supply. 
5. Remove the mounting bolts from the 24 VDC power supply and remove the box. 
6. Obtain a replacement 24 VDC power supply from inventory. 
7. Install the new power supply. 
8. Connect power lines to the cRIO. 
9. Plug the 24 VDC Power Supply in to the PDU Port 9. 
10. Command power to PDU B1 Port 9 ON. 
11. Wait for the cRIO to power up. 
12. Command each WSN to ON 
13. Wait for WSN nodes to join the network – 5 – 10 minutes 
14. Conduct checkout of cRIO functionality – WSN data is flowing, CO2 and O2 sensor 
data is flowing, and SSLM control via SW is available. 
 Use the ACAWS display and confirm that the cRIO, 24 VDC Power Supply, and 
WSN motes are not listed as a BAD or SUSPECT components. The ACAWS 
connectivity display shows the components with white outlines. Any of these 
indications confirm that the 24 VDC Power Supply is providing power to the 
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cRIO. Problems with any WSN motes indicated on the ACAWS connectivity 
display or the ACAWS WSN Display could indicate that the cRIO did not boot 
up properly, and may require recycling power to the cRIO, repeating steps 12 
– 14.   
Repair Procedure – cRIO 
1. Lift the floorboards in Segment A and locate the cRIO. 
2. Command power to PDU B1 Port 9 to OFF. 
 This cuts power from the 24 VDC power supply to ensure that power is not 
hot to the cRIO. 
3. Command power to the PDU B1 Port 10 to OFF 
 This removes power to the 28 VDC power supply to assure that no current is 
on when working on the cRIO 
 This step will remove power to external spotlights; if they are in use, 
consider making the repair at a time when they are not needed, but if not 
practical, this step can be skipped. 
4. Disconnect the cRIO power input from the 24 VDC Power Supply. 
5. Disconnect WSN power control connector that runs to the WSN Interface box 
 The connector includes 11 WSN neutral power lines and 6 CO2 neutral power 
lines. 
6. Disconnect the 6 CO2 sensor inputs and 2 O2 sensor inputs. Make sure that the 
connectors are labeled so that they can be connected in the same way to the 
replacement cRIO. 
7. Disconnect the SSLM Lighting Control connector that runs to the Lighting Interface 
Box 
8. Disconnect 8 HIMS sensor inputs from the cRIO. Assure they are labeled so they can 
be reconnected in the same location to the replacement cRIO. 
9. Disconnect the Ethernet connector from the cRIO. 
10. Remove the mounting fasteners from the cRIO and remove the box. 
11. Obtain a replacement cRIO from inventory. 
12. Install the new cRIO. 
13. Connect the Ethernet connector to the cRIO. 
14. Connect 8 HIMS sensor input lines. 
15. Connect SSLM Lighting Control connector. 
16. Connect the 6 CO2 and 2 O2 sensors to the same ports as they were on the old cRIO. 
17. Connect the WSN and CO2 power control connector to the WSN Interface Box. 
18. Connect the power input to the 24 VDC Power Supply. 
19. Command power to PDU Port 10 to ON to supply 28 VDC power (if turned off at step 
3). 
20. Command power to PDU Port 9 to ON to supply 24 VDC power to the cRIO. 
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21. Wait for the cRIO to power up. 
22. Command each WSN to ON 
23. Wait for WSN nodes to join the network – 5 – 10 minutes 
24. Conduct checkout of cRIO functionality 
 Check that one or more sensor values are reported from each of 11 WSN 
motes. Use the ACAWS displays to observe that sensor data is reported as 
valid and the data is updating. This verifies that the connections to the WSN 
control lines are all correct. 
 Check that data from each of 6 CO2 and 2 O2 sensors is available. Refer to 
ACAWS displays to observe that CO2 and O2 sensor data is reported as valid 
and data is updating. This confirms that power control connectors to the CO2 
sensors are correct, and that data input connections from CO2 and O2 sensors 
are also correct, and that the Ethernet is connected correctly and the cRIO is 
communicating. 
 Send a command to one of the SSLMs to turn the light OFF and back ON (or 
ON, then OFF). Commands can be sent from any location with commanding 
authority - iPad display, MCC, procedure execution tools or possibly other 
applications. Successful command execution verifies the Lighting Control 
interface was connected correctly. 
 Check HIMS data. Use HIMS procedures/documentation for this. This verifies 
that HIMS data interfaces were connected correctly. If HIMS is off at the time 
of the test, execute HIMS Initialization Procedures prior to the test. 
Scenario 3 – Loss of 28 VDC Power 
This scenario involves loss of 28 VDC power to the WSN motes and CO2 sensors. It could be 
caused by a loss of 28 VDC converter but the cRIO 9477 card failure has nearly identical 
impacts. A manual test is needed to differentiate. One approach is to turn on the exterior 
spotlights and see if they turn on. Another is to perform troubleshooting under the floor to 
determine if power is being generated. 
 
It is also possible that a 9477 Card Failure could result in partial loss, either with some but 
not all WSN or CO2 sensors losing power, or intermittent power to some or all WSN and 
CO2 sensors. If this occurs and the WSN or sensor can be confirmed to be good (connecting 
to an unaffected power source, or other testing), the cRIO or the 9477 Card will need to be 
replaced.  
 
If a replacement cRIO 9477 Card is available, it can be replaced easily without needing to 
power down the cRIO. It may also be possible to swap cRIO 2 for cRIO 1, since there is 
much less equipment on cRIO 2 in the X-Hab unit. 
Diagnostic Procedures 
1. Perform the Spotlight-Check procedure on any one of the spotlights (B, D, F, H) 
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 The operator should check the ACAWS Diagnostic Display for diagnostic 
reasoner conclusions based on the results of the Spotlight-Check procedure. 
  Test Passes – will be directed to execute Repair Procedure - cRIO 9477 Card 
Replacement  
 Test Fails – will be directed to execute Repair Procedure – 28 VDC 
Replacement 
 Test Unknown – will be directed to execute additional electrical system 
trouble-shooting procedures 
2. If results from the Spotlight-Check are UNKNOWN, perform the 28VDC-Converter-
Power-Check procedure. 
Repair Procedure – 28 VDC Power Supply 
1. Lift the floorboards in Segment B and locate the 28 VDC Converter. 
2. Command power to PDU B1 Port 10 to OFF. 
 This cuts power to the 28 VDC Converter to ensure that power is not hot 
during the procedure. 
3. Disconnect power input from the PDU. 
4. Disconnect power output to the Terminal Strip Box. 
5. Remove mounting fasteners from the 28 VDC Converter and remove the converter. 
6. Obtain a replacement 28 VDC Converter from inventory. 
7. Install the 28 VDC Converter using mounting hardware from the failed unit. 
8. Connect power outputs to the Terminal Strip Box. 
9. Connect power to the PDU. 
10. Command PDU B1 Port 10 to ON using any suitable commanding method – iPad 
displays, procedure tools, MCC or other. 
11. If necessary, command the WSN motes and CO2 sensor power to ON 
 Depends on how the cRIO switches default when it powers up; if they default 
to OFF they will need to be commanded ON, otherwise this step is not needed 
12. Wait for the WSN motes to join the network – 5-10 minutes 
13. Verify 28 VDC power by observing any powered item – any CO2 sensor, WSN mote 
or external spotlight confirm that 28 VDC power is available. ACAWS diagnosis can 
verify repair success; it will report that 28 VDC is good (by removing it from the 
BAD and SUSPECT list) as soon as any 28 VDC equipment tests pass; intermediate 
diagnoses may list various SUSPECT components until all WSN motes have joined 
the network. When all 28 VDC equipment is fully functional, ACAWS will report 
nominal conditions with no BAD or SUSPECT components related to 28 VDC power. 
Repair Procedure – cRIO 9477 Card 
1. Lift the floorboard in Segment A and locate the cRIO. 
2. Locate the 9477 Card slot in the cRIO. Remove the connector. 
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3. Remove the 9477 Card from the slot. 
4. Obtain a replacement card from inventory. 
5. Install the 9477 Card in the slot. 
6. Connect the multi-pin connector to the card. 
7. If necessary, command the WSN motes and CO2 sensor power to ON 
 Depends on how the cRIO switches default when it powers up; if they default 
to OFF they will need to be commanded ON, otherwise this step is not needed 
8. Wait for the WSN motes to join the network – 5-10 minutes 
9. Conduct checkout of the WSN channels to assure they have powered up correctly 
 Use the ACAWS display to check that WSN motes are indicated with a white 
outline, indicating that the WSN is working. If some but not all WSN motes 
are functioning, there may be a problem with a connector or possible a 
command channel was not set. Initially try commanding the channel to OFF 
and then back ON, wait for the power-up time and check again. If the WSN 
mote still does not come up, there may be a problem with the connector; 
remove the connector, carefully inspect the pins on the connector and if 
there does not seem to be any bent or damaged pins, reconnect and try again. 
Manual Diagnostic Test Procedures 
There are several tests in the TEAMS Model that rely on manual tests to be performed. 
Procedures for executing these tests are outlined here. Some of these are simple one-step 
actions; some are basic outlines of more complicated activities. In all cases the operator is 
expected to indicate a test pass or failure via the Procedure Display tool. The procedure 
names used are the TEAMS test name with which each procedure is associated. 
24VDC-PowerSupply-LED-Check 
1. Lift the floorboard in Segment A where the cRIO and 24 VDC Power Supply are 
located. 
2. Locate the 24 VDC Power Supply and examine the box. Look for a green LED 
indicator light. If the light is out, report ‘LED Test Fail’ in the procedure display. 
3.  
CabinTempTest 
1. This is an operator check of cabin temperature based on an operator’s subjective 
assessment of the temperature. If the crewmember feels that the temperature is 
significantly warmer or colder than temperature settings, report FAIL, otherwise 
PASS. 
HabitatTempTest 
1. This is an operator check of the habitat module (X-Hab) based on an operator’s 
subjective assessment of the temperature. If the crewmember feels that the 
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temperature in the inflatable habitat module is significantly warmer or colder than 
temperature settings, report FAIL, otherwise PASS. 
One-Light-Off 
1. This test would normally be done only when a problem with lighting is evident, such 
as a light burning out or being unresponsive to either commands or switch 
activation. Crewmembers would not normally be asked to methodically check all 
lights using this procedure. 
2. If a single light goes out or can’t be turned on either by commanding with crew user 
interface or with manual switches on the light module, but other lights function 
normally, report FAIL. If all lights are in their expected state report PASS. 
Power-to-SSLMX-ok 
1. If the light is on when commanded or when turned on using manual switches, report 
PASS. Otherwise report FAIL. 
NOTE – there are TEAMS tests for each of 8 Solid State Light Modules (SSLMs). 
Substitute the SSLM number for ‘X’ to check each light individually. SSLM 1 is in 
Segment A, SSLM 2 in Segment B, etc. 
Lights-commanded-on-ok 
1. This is a test to determine if operator actions have been conducted as expected.  
2. If a light is not in its expected ON/OFF state, check command logs to determine if a 
light command has been sent to the light in question, and it was the desired ON or 
OFF command. If the correct command was sent, report PASS. If an incorrect 
command was sent, or a desired command was not sent, report FAIL. 
Light-Command-Response-Test 
This test checks the lighting command pathways using any of the available SSLMs. 
1. Select a light that can be turned on and off with minimal disturbance to other work. 
2. If the selected SSLM is currently OFF, send an ON command; if it is currently ON, 
send an OFF command. 
3. If the SSLM responds to the command, report PASS, otherwise FAIL. 
4. Send a command to restore the light to its original state, as desired. 
Manual-Switch-is-on-ok 
This test is performed on a light that is not on, and commands to turn it on have not 
succeeded. 
1. Check the SSLM Master switch position. If the switch is in the ON position report 
PASS, otherwise FAIL. 
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Dimmer-Switch-is-bright-ok 
This test is performed on a light that is not on and commands to turn it on have not 
succeeded. 
1. Check the dimmer knob position. If it is rotated fully or mostly toward the DIM 
position (counterclockwise) report FAIL. If it is more than three-fourths to the 
BRIGHT position (clockwise) report PASS. If turning the dimmer toward BRIGHT 
turns the light ON, report FAIL; this will let the diagnostic reasoned know that the 
cause of the problem was an inadvertent dimmer position. The dimmer should be 
set at the desired setting at the conclusion of the test. 
Multiple-Lights-Out 
This test is used primarily to determine if power is available to the SSLMs. No operator 
actions are needed; if the problem were caused by gross mismanagement of lighting 
procedures, other diagnostic and procedure steps will direct the operator to command and 
configure lights.  
1. If any SSLM is ON, report PASS, otherwise report FAIL. 
Trash-Compactor-Check 
1. Turn the Trash Compactor ON. If it operates, report PASS. If it does not operate at 
all, report FAIL. 
HIMS-Display-Check 
This is a check for power to the HIMS display. 
1. If the HIMS display is currently OFF, turn it ON. 
2. If the HIMS display is working, report PASS, otherwise report FAIL. 
Task-Light-Check 
This is a check for power to the task light in the General Maintenance Work Area. 
1. Check that the GMWS Task Light is plugged into the power strip. 
2. Turn the light ON. If it turns on, report PASS, otherwise report FAIL. 
GMWS-Hoist-Check 
This is a check for power to the GMWS Hoist. 
1. Locate the GMWS Hoist controls in Segment D. 
2. If the GMWS Hoist is not currently in use, check the area to make sure that brief 
activation of the hoist will not cause damage or injury. If the hoist is in use, 
coordinate with the operator using it to conduct the test. 
3. Briefly activate and then immediately deactivate the hoist. If it operates, report 
PASS. If it does not operate at all, report FAIL. 
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GMWS-PowerStrip1-Check 
1. Plug any available free-standing electrical equipment into GMWS Power Strip # 1 in 
Segment D. The vacuum cleaner, a light, cell phone charger or anything that 
provides an obvious response when turned on, will suffice. If the item operates 
when turned ON, report PASS, otherwise report FAIL. 
Spotlight-Check 
Any one of four TEAMS tests can be used: Spot-B-Check, Spot-D-Check, Spot-F-Check, Spot-
H-Check. 
 
These checks determine if external spotlights are functioning. They require an observation 
of the lights by a person. Spotlight F may be visible from the exterior camera, the others 
require an exterior crewmember during the day. At night it may be possible to tell if a light 
has come on by looking out a window or using the exterior camera. 
1. If there is an exterior crew member in the vicinity of the HDU, determine the 
crewmember’s location to determine which light is visible from the location. Turn 
on the selected light using the wall switch located near the Segment A hatch. 
2. If an external crewmember is not available to assist with the test, use the external 
camera to see if the light comes on. Slew the exterior camera to point at spotlight H 
using the camera controls at the GeoLab. Turn on Spotlight H with the wall switch 
located near the Segment A hatch. 
3. Determine if the light turned on, either from exterior crewmember report or from 
observing the light with the camera. If the light is on, report PASS, and if the light is 
not on, report FAIL. If the light can’t be seen with the camera due to sunlight or 
slewing constraints, report UNKNOWN. 
Internal-Outlet-Check 
1. Plug in a free-standing device to the internal outlet located in Segment D.  Any 120 VAC 
equipment with a standard plug will work. 
2. Turn the item on. If it runs normally, report PASS, if it does not operate, report FAIL. 
External-Power-Switch-is-not-off 
This test is used to determine if the power was inadvertently turned off from the main 
power switch. 
1. If there is any power to any equipment in the HDU, report PASS. 
2. If there is no power in the HDU, check the main power switch. If the switch is OFF, 
report FAIL. If the switch is ON report PASS. 
WSN-Signal-Check 
This is a test to determine if the cRIO 9477 Card is successfully controlling power to the 
WSN Interface Box. There is currently not a tester that could perform this test, and the 
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simplest means to perform this check would be to replace the cRIO 9477 Card and see if the 
new one works. 
1. Execute Repair Procedure - cRIO 9477 Card. 
2. If the new cRIO Card works correctly, report PASS. If the card does not work, report 
FAIL. 
3. If the test fails, replace the original cRIO 9477 Card in the cRIO and return the new 
one to inventory. 
cRIO-LED-Check 
1. Lift the floorboard opening in Segment A and locate the cRIO. 
2. Check for a green LED on the box. If the light is ON, report PASS. If no light is 
observed, report FAIL. 
WSN-IF-Continuity-Check 
1. Lift the floorboard opening in Segment B and locate the WSN Interface Box. 
2. Remove the cover from the WSN Interface Box. 
3. Use an electrical test tool to conduct a conductivity test by placing one electrode of 
the tester on an available test point at the input side of the box, and one electrode on 
an exposed wiring connector at the output side of the box. 
4. If the electrical tester indicates that there is an electrical path through the box, 
report PASS. Otherwise, report FAIL. 
5. Replace the cover on the WSN Interface Box. 
 28VDC-Converter-Power-Check 
1. Lift the floorboard in Segment B where the 28 VDC is located. Locate the 28 VDC 
Converter unit. 
2. Inspect the 28 VDC converter for a red indicator light. If the light is not on, report 
FAIL. 
 The converter is probably producing power if the indicator light is on. 
3. Confirm power generation by using an electrical tester to read the current from the 
28 VDC Converter. Locate available current test points and at the converter output 
or in the WSN Interface Box and contact the tester leads to read voltage output. If 
the current reading is above 26 volts, report PASS, otherwise report FAIL. 
4. If tests can’t be completed, report UNKNOWN. 
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Appendix D: TEAMS Diagnostic Model 
 
The TEAMS model developed from the schematics of the HDU, is partitioned  hierarchically 
into seven subsystems: Power, Avionics, Communications, Geolab, Environmental Control 
and Monitoring, Crew Accommodations and Food Production. 
 
Figure 13: Power Subsystem 
TEAMS Module Failure Mode Failure Signals 
120AC120DCConverter_B-P5 ACDCFailure 120DC-Power 
ACDCFailure, 
Data 
24VDC-PowerSupply 24VDC-PowerSupply-failure 24VDC-Power 
24VDC-Power2 
light-command 
28VDCConverter_B-J4 28VDC-B-Failure B1-28VDC-Power 
28VDCConverter_F-L3 28VDC-F-Failure F-converter 
GMWS-Power-Strip-2 GMWS-Power-Strip-2-failure B1-Power 
JB2_G-T3 JunctionBoxFailure 24VDC-Power 
24VDC-Power2 
B1-28VDC-Power 
B1-Power 
F2-Power 
H1-Power 
JunctionBoxFailure 
Power 
PDU-B-1_B-M5 PDU-B-1-Bank1CurrentSensorFailure PDU2Bank1CurrentSensorFailure 
 PDU-B-1-No-Current-Failure 24VDC-Power 
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TEAMS Testpoint TEAMS Test Failure Signals 
PDU-F-CurrentTestpoint PDU-F-CurrentTest Power, 
F2-Power 
PDU-B-1-CurrentTestpoint PDU-B-1-CurrentTest Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
Power 
 PDU-B-1-CurrentValidityTest Total-Power-Failure, 
PDU2CurrentSensorFailure 
PDU-H-1-CurrentTestpoint PDU-H1-CurrentTest Power, 
H1-Power 
PDU-B-1-Bank1-CurrentTestpoint PDU-B-1-Bank1-CurrentTest PDU2Failure, 
Power 
 PDU-B-1-Bank1-CurrentValidityTest PDU2Bank1CurrentSensorFailure, 
Total-Power-Failure 
PDU-B-1-Bank2-CurrentTestpoint PDU-B-1-Bank2-CurrentTest PDU2Failure, 
24VDC-Power2 
B1-28VDC-Power 
B1-Power 
Data 
light-command 
PDU2Failure 
Power 
 PDU-B-1-Bank2CurrentSensorFailure PDU2Bank2CurrentSensorFailure 
 PDU-B-1-CurrentSensorFailure PDU2CurrentSensorFailure 
 PDU-B-1-Total-Failure 24VDC-Power 
24VDC-Power2 
B1-28VDC-Power 
B1-Power 
Data 
light-command 
PDU2Failure 
Power 
Total-Power-Failure 
PDU-F_F-Q5 PDU-F-DataFailure Data 
 PDU-F-Failure Data 
F2-Power 
PDUFailure 
PDU-H-1_H-Q5 PDU-H-1-Failure Data 
H1-Power 
Power 
 PDU-H-1-DataFailure Data 
Source SourceFailure 24VDC-Power 
24VDC-Power2 
B1-28VDC-Power 
B1-Power 
F2-Power 
H1-Power 
Power 
SourceFailure 
TB-Box   
TerminalStripBox   
120AC120DCConverter_B-P5 ACDCFailure 120DC-Power 
ACDCFailure 
Data 
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Power 
 PDU-B-1-Bank2-CurrentValidityTest PDU2Bank2CurrentSensorFailure, 
Total-Power-Failure 
24VDC-PowerSupply-LED-
CheckTestpoint 
24VDC-PowerSupply-LED-Check 24VDC-Power 
28VDC-Converter-Power-Check 28VDC-Converter-Power-Check B1-28VDC-Power 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Avionics Subsystem 
TEAMS Module Failure Mode Failure Signals 
AVDAQ_D-N3 AVDAQPowerFailure AVDAQFailure 
Data 
Power 
 AVDAQDataFailure AVDAQFailure 
Data 
AVSwitch_D-L7 AVSwitchDataFailure Data 
CDHSwitch_E-Q7 CDHSwitchFailure CDHSwitchFailure 
Data 
 CDHSwitchPowerFailure Data 
Power 
Comm-Svc-Assembly CSA-Failure ExternalCommunications 
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Control_SW ECLSSControlSWFailure ECLSSControlSWFailure 
O2-Data 
 LightingControlSWFailure light-command 
LightingControlSWFailure 
 PowerControlSWFailure PowerControlSWFailure 
 CommsControlSWFailure CommsControlSWFailure 
Wireless-Data 
 FoodControlSWFailure FoodControlSWFailure 
 GeoLabControlSWFailure GeoLabControlSWFailure 
 CrewAccomControlSWFailure CrewAccomControlSWFailure 
 AvionicsControlSWFailure AvionicsControlSWFailure 
 TCSControlSWFailure TCSControlSWFailure 
cRIO cRIO-failure 24VDC-Power 
24VDC-Power2 
cRIO-failure 
Data 
light-command 
 9223-HIMS-Preamp-Data2-failure Data 
 9477-WSN-control-failure B1-28VDC-Power 
cRIO-28VDC-Ctrl 
 9223-HIMS-Preamp-Data1-failure Data 
 9219-SensorData-failure cRIO-DAQ 
 9476-LightingInterfaceBoxControl-failure light-command 
DataServer_E-O2 DataServerFailure Data 
DataServerFailure 
Power 
DECTVOIP_D-N4 DECTVOIPDataFailure Data 
DECTVOIPFailure 
 DECTVOIPPowerFailure Data 
DECTVOIPFailure 
Power 
HIMS-Pre-amp-and-Power-Supply HIMS-Pre-amp-and-Power-Supply-failure Data 
Power 
LightingInterfaceBox LightingInterfaceBox-failure light-command 
MMOD-Sensors   
MMOD-1-Sensor MMOD-1-Sensor-failure MMOD-1-failure 
MMOD-2-Sensor MMOD-2-Sensor-failure MMOD-2-failure 
MMOD-3-Sensor MMOD-3-Sensor-failure MMOD-3-failure 
MMOD-4-Sensor MMOD-4-Sensor-failure MMOD-4-failure 
MMOD-5-Sensor MMOD-5-Sensor-failure MMOD-5-failure 
MMOD-6-Sensor MMOD-6-Sensor-failure MMOD-6-failure 
MMOD-7-Sensor MMOD-7-Sensor-failure MMOD-7-failure 
MMOD-8-Sensor MMOD-8-Sensor-failure MMOD-8-failure 
NAT_D-N3 NATPowerFailure Data 
NATFailure 
Power 
 NATDataFailure Data 
NATFailure 
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NVR_D-N5 NVRPowerFailure Data 
NVRFailure 
Power 
 NVRDataFailure Data 
NVRFailure 
OC1_E-P4 OC1Failure Data 
OC1Failure 
Power 
OC2_E-P5 OC2Failure Data 
OC2Failure 
Power 
Rack1_D-Q8   
Rack2_E-S8   
RIUs CommsRIUFailure CommsRIUFailure 
Wireless-Data 
 RPC2RIUFailure RPC2RIUFailure 
 ECLSSRIU1Failure ECLSSRIU1Failure 
O2-Data 
 RPC1RIUFailure RPC1RIUFailure 
 UPS2RIUFailure UPS2RIUFailure 
 AvionicsRacksRIUFailure AvionicsRIUFailure 
 ECLSSRIU2failure ECLSSRIU2failure 
 TCSRIU3Failure TCSRIU3Failure 
 UPS1RIUFAilure UPS1RIUFAilure 
 LightingRIUFailure light-command 
LightingRIUFailure 
 TCSRIU1Failure TCSRIU1Failure 
 TCSRIU2Failure TCSRIU2Failure 
 PDURIU3Failure PDU3RIUFailure 
 FoodProdRIU2Failure FoodProdRIUFailure 
 FoodProdRIU1Failure FoodProdRIUFailure 
Veg-CO2-Data 
 PDURIU2Failure PDU2RIUFailure 
 GeoLabRIUFailure GeoLabRIUFailure 
 PDURIU1Failure PDU1RIUFailure 
RPC1_D-R7 RPCPowerFailure Data 
Power 
 RPC-Current-Sensor-Failure Data 
RPC1CurrentSensorFailure 
RPC2_D-R6 RPC2-Current-Sensor-Failure Data 
RPC2CurrentSensorFailure 
 RPC2PowerFailure Data 
Power 
RPC2PowerFailure 
UPS1_D-T7 UPS1PowerFailure Data 
Power 
 UPS1-Current-Sensor-Failure Data 
UPS1CurrentSensorFailure 
UPS2_D-T6 UPS2-Current-Sensor-Failure Data 
UPS2CurrentSensorFailure 
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 UPS2PowerFailure Data 
Power 
UPS-and-RPC-CrossStrap   
WNC_D-N7 WNCDataFailure Data 
WNCDataFailure 
 WNCPowerFailure Data 
Power 
WNCDataFailure 
WSNGateway_D-N4 WSNGatewayFailure Data 
Power 
WSN-Interface-Box WSN-Interface-Box-failure B1-28VDC-Power 
WSN-IF-Continuity 
 
 
TEAMS Testpoint TEAMS Test Failure Signals 
Airlock-CO2-Sensor Testpoint Airlock-CO2-Validity 24VDC-Power,  
B1-Power, 
24VDC-Power 
 Airlock-CO2-Sensor Airlock-CO2, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
B1-28VDC-Power 
AVDAQTestpoint AVDAQ-Heartbeat-Test AVDAQFailure, 
F2-Power 
AvionicsControlSWTestpoint AvionicsControlSW-Heartbeat-Test AvionicsControlSWFailure 
AvionicsRacksRIU1Testpoint AvionicsRacksRIU1-Heartbeat-Test AvionicsRIUFailure 
AVSwith-Testpoint AVSwith-Test Data 
CDHSwitchTestpoint CDHSwitch-Heartbeat-Test CDHSwitchFailure, 
F2-Power 
CommsControlSWTestpoint CommsControlSW-Heartbeat-Test CommsControlSWFailure 
CommsRIU1Testpoint CommsRIU1-Heartbeat-Test CommsRIUFailure 
CrewAccomSWTestpoint CrewAccomSW-Heartbeat-Test CrewAccomControlSWFailure 
cRIO-Heartbeat-Testpoint cRIO-Heartbeat-Test cRIO-failure, 
24VDC-Power 
cRIO-LED-Check cRIO-LED-Check 24VDC-Power 
DataServerFailure DataServer-Heartbeat-Failure DataServerFailure, 
F2-Power 
DECTVOIPTest DECTVOIP-Heartbeat-Test DECTVOIPFailure 
F2-Power 
ECLSSControlSWTest ECLSSControlSW-Heartbeat-Test ECLSSControlSWFailure 
ECLSSRIU1Test ECLSSRIU1-Heartbeat-Test ECLSSRIU1Failure 
ECLSSRIU2Test ECLSSRIU2-Heartbeat-Test ECLSSRIU2failure 
External-Comm-Check External-Comm-Check ExternalCommunications, 
B1-28VDC-Power 
FoodControlSWTest FoodControlSW-Heartbeat-Test FoodControlSWFailure 
FoodProdRIU1Test FoodProdRIU1-Heartbeat-Test FoodProdRIUFailure 
FoodProdRIU2Test FoodProdRIU2-Heartbeat-Test FoodProdRIUFailure 
GeoLabControlSWTest GeoLabControlSW-Heartbeat-Test GeoLabControlSWFailure 
GeoLabRIU1Test GeoLabRIU1-Heartbeat-Test GeoLabRIUFailure 
Hygiene-CO2-SensorTestpoint Hygiene-CO2-Validity-Test 24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
cRIO-failure 
Hygiene-CO2-Sensor-Testpoint Hygiene-CO2-Sensor-Test Hygiene-CO2, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
B1-28VDC-Power 
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LightingControlSWTest LightingControlSW-Heartbeat-Test LightingControlSWFailure 
MMOD-1-SensorTestpoint MMOD-1-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-1-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
MMOD-2-Sensor Testpoint MMOD-2-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-2-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
MMOD-3-Sensor Testpoint MMOD-3-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-3-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
MMOD-4-Sensor Testpoint MMOD-4-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-4-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
MMOD-5-Sensor Testpoint MMOD-5-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-5-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
MMOD-6-Sensor Testpoint MMOD-6-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-6-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
MMOD-7-Sensor Testpoint MMOD-7-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-7-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
MMOD-8-Sensor Testpoint MMOD-8-SensorTest Data, 
MMOD-8-failure, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power 
NATTestpoint NAT-Heartbeat-Test NATFailure, 
F2-Power 
O2-Airlock-SensorTestpoint O2-Airlock-Validity Test 24VDC-Power, 
cRIO-failure 
O2-Airlock-Sensor Testpoint O2-Airlock-Sensor Test O2-Airlock, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
H1-Power 
O2-B1-Sensor  Testpoint O2-B1-Validity Test 24VDC-Power, 
cRIO-failure 
O2-B1-Sensor O2-B1-Sensor O2-B1, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
H1-Power 
OC1Test OC1-Heartbeat-Test OC1Failure, 
F2-Power 
OC2Test OC2-Heartbeat-Test OC2Failure, 
F2-Power 
PDURIU1Test PowerRIU1-Heartbeat-Test PDU1RIUFailure 
PDURIU2Test PDU2RIU-Heartbeat-Test PDU2RIUFailure 
PDURIU3Test PDU3RIU-Heartbeat-Test PDU3RIUFailure 
PowerControlSWTest PowerControlSW-Heartbeat-Test PowerControlSWFailure 
RPC1CurrentTest RPC1CurrentTest F2-Power 
 RPC1CurrentSensorTest RPC1CurrentSensorFailure 
RPC1RIUTest RPC1RIU-Heartbeat-Test RPC1RIUFailure 
RPC2CurrentTest RPC2CurrentTest RPC2PowerFailure, 
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F2-Power 
 RPC2Current-Sensor-Test RPC2CurrentSensorFailure 
RPC2RIUTest RPC2RIU-Heartbeat-Test RPC2RIUFailure 
TCSControlSWTest TCSControlSW-Heartbeat-Test TCSControlSWFailure 
TCSRIU1Test TCSRIU1-Heartbeat-Test TCSRIU1Failure 
TCSRIU2Test TCSRIU2-Heartbeat-Test TCSRIU2Failure 
TCSRIU3Test TCSRIU3-Heartbeat-Test TCSRIU3Failure 
UPS1CurrentTest UPS1CurrentTest F2-Power 
 UPS1Current-Sensor-Test UPS1CurrentSensorFailure 
UPS1RIUTest UPS1RIU-Heartbeat-Test UPS1RIUFAilure 
UPS2CurrentTest UPS2CurrentTest F2-Power 
 UPS2Current-Sensor-Test UPS1CurrentSensorFailure 
UPS2RIUTest UPS2RIU-Heartbeat-Test UPS2RIUFailure 
Veggie-CO2-A1-Sensor Veggie-CO2-A1-Validity 24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
cRIO-failure 
 Veggie-CO2-A1-Sensor Veg-CO2-A1, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
B1-28VDC-Power 
Veggie-CO2-C1-Sensor Veggie-CO2-C1-Validity 24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
cRIO-failure 
 Veggie-CO2-C1-Sensor Veg-CO2-C1, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
B1-28VDC-Power 
Veggie-CO2-E1-Sensor Veggie-CO2-E1-Validity 24VDC-Power, 
cRIO-failure 
 Veggie-CO2-E1-Sensor Veg-CO2-E1, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
B1-28VDC-Power 
Veggie-CO2-G1-Sensor Veggie-CO2-G1-Validity 24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
cRIO-failure 
 Veggie-CO2-G1-Sensor Veg-CO2-G1, 
cRIO-DAQ, 
B1-28VDC-Power 
WNCTest WNC-Heartbeat-Test WNCDataFailure, 
F2-Power 
WSN-IF-Continuity-Check WSN-IF-Continuity-Check WSN-IF-Continuity 
WSN-Signal-Check WSN-Signal-Check B1-28VDC-Power, 
cRIO-28VDC-Ctrl 
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Figure 15: Communication Subsystem 
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TEAMS Testpoint TEAMS Test Failure Signals 
dP-A1-Sensor dP-A1-Sensor dP-A1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-A2-Sensor dP-A2-Sensor dP-A2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-B1-Sensor dP-B1-Sensor dP-B1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-B2-Sensor dP-B2-Sensor dP-B2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-C1-Sensor dP-C1-Sensor dP-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-C2-Sensor dP-C2-Sensor dP-C2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-D1-Sensor dP-D1-Sensor dP-D1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
dP-E1-Sensor dP-E1-Sensor dP-E1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-F1-Sensor dP-F1-Sensor dP-F1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
dP-G1-Sensor dP-G1-Sensor dP-G1-Sensor, 
TEAMS Module Failure Mode Failure Signals 
WN1_B-P9 WN1Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN10_E-L14 WN10Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN11_Hyg-H10 WN11Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN12_X-HAB-W17 WN12Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN13_X-Hab-J10 WN13Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN2_E-R12 WN2Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN3_G-Q7 WN3Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN4_G-Q10 WN4Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN5_A-N10 WN5Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN6_C-O9 WN6failure 24VDC-Power 
WN7_F-S9 WN7Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN8_AL-H10 WN8Failure 24VDC-Power 
WN9_A-Q12 WN9Failure 24VDC-Power 
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24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
ExTC-A1-Sensor ExTC-A1-Sensor ExTC-A1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
ExTC-B1-Sensor ExTC-B1-Sensor ExTC-B1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
ExTC-C1-Sensor ExTC-C1-Sensor ExTC-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
ExTC-D1-Sensor ExTC-D1-Sensor ExTC-D1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
ExTC-E1-Sensor ExTC-E1-Sensor ExTC-E1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
ExTC-G1-Sensor ExTC-G1-Sensor ExTC-G1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
ExTC-H1-Sensor ExTC-H1-Sensor ExTC-H1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Hum-Hyg-1-Sensor Hum-Hyg-1-Sensor Hum-Hyg-1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Hum-TC-Hyg-1-Sensor Hum-TC-Hyg-1-Sensor Hum-TC-Hyg-1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Hum-TC-Xhab-1-Sensor Hum-TC-Xhab-1-Sensor Hum-TC-Xhab-1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
Hum-Temp-B1-Sensor Hum-Temp-B1-Sensor Hum-Temp-B1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Hum-Temp-C1-Sensor Hum-Temp-C1-Sensor Hum-Temp-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Hum-Temp-D1-Sensor Hum-Temp-D1-Sensor Hum-Temp-D1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Hum-Xhab-1-Sensor Hum-Xhab-1-Sensor Hum-Xhab-1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
73 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-A1-Sensor TC-A1-Sensor TC-A1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-A2-Sensor TC-A2-Sensor TC-A2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-A3-Sensor TC-A3-Sensor TC-A3-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-A4-Sensor TC-A4-Sensor TC-A4-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-A5-Sensor TC-A5-Sensor TC-A5-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-A-L-2-Sensor TC-A-L-2-Sensor TC-A-L-2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-A-L-3-Sensor TC-A-L-3-Sensor TC-A-L-3-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-B1-Sensor TC-B1-Sensor TC-B1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-B2-Sensor TC-B2-Sensor TC-B2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-C1-Sensor TC-C1-Sensor TC-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-C2-Sensor TC-C2-Sensor TC-C2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-C3-Sensor TC-C3-Sensor TC-C3-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-C4-Sensor TC-C4-Sensor TC-C4-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-D1-Sensor TC-D1-Sensor TC-D1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-D2-Sensor TC-D2-Sensor TC-D2-Sensor, 
Version 1.0: September 30, 2011 
Lilly.Spirkovska@nasa.gov 
 
74 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-Dust-G5-Sensor TC-Dust-G5-Sensor TC-Dust-G5-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-E1-Sensor TC-E1-Sensor TC-E1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-E2-Sensor TC-E2-Sensor TC-E2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-E3-Sensor TC-E3-Sensor TC-E3-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-E4-Sensor TC-E4-Sensor TC-E4-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-E5-Sensor TC-E5-Sensor TC-E5-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-F1-Sensor TC-F1-Sensor TC-F1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-F2-Sensor TC-F2-Sensor TC-F2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-G1-Sensor TC-G1-Sensor TC-G1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-G2-Sensor TC-G2-Sensor TC-G2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-G3-Sensor TC-G3-Sensor TC-G3-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-G4-Sensor TC-G4-Sensor TC-G4-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-G5-Sensor TC-G5-Sensor TC-G5-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-H1-Sensor TC-H1-Sensor TC-H1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
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B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-H2-Sensor TC-H2-Sensor TC-H2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-Hyg-1-Sensor TC-Hyg-1-Sensor TC-Hyg-1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-Hyg-2-Sensor TC-Hyg-2-Sensor TC-Hyg-2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
TC-Xhab-1-Sensor TC-Xhab-1-Sensor TC-Xhab-1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-2-Sensor TC-Xhab-2-Sensor TC-Xhab-2-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-3-Sensor TC-Xhab-3-Sensor TC-Xhab-3-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-4-Sensor TC-Xhab-4-Sensor TC-Xhab-4-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-5-Sensor TC-Xhab-5-Sensor TC-Xhab-5-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-6-Sensor TC-Xhab-6-Sensor TC-Xhab-6-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-7-Sensor TC-Xhab-7-Sensor TC-Xhab-7-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-8-Sensor TC-Xhab-8-Sensor TC-Xhab-8-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
TC-Xhab-9-Sensor TC-Xhab-9-Sensor TC-Xhab-9-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
Veg-Hum-A1-Sensor Veg-Hum-A1-Sensor Veg-Hum-A1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Hum-C1-Sensor Veg-Hum-C1-Sensor Veg-Hum-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Hum-E1-Sensor Veg-Hum-E1-Sensor Veg-Hum-E1-Sensor, 
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24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Hum-G1-Sensor Veg-Hum-G1-Sensor Veg-Hum-G1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Hum-TC-A1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-A1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-A1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Hum-TC-C1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-C1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Hum-TC-E1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-E1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-E1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Hum-TC-G1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-G1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-G1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Photo-A1-Sensor Veg-Photo-A1-Sensor Veg-Photo-A1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Photo-C1-Sensor Veg-Photo-C1-Sensor Veg-Photo-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Photo-E1-Sensor Veg-Photo-E1-Sensor Veg-Photo-E1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-Photo-G1-Sensor Veg-Photo-G1-Sensor Veg-Photo-G1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-A1-Sensor Veg-TC-A1-Sensor Veg-TC-A1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
B1-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-B1-Sensor Veg-TC-B1-Sensor Veg-TC-B1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-C1-Sensor Veg-TC-C1-Sensor Veg-TC-C1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-D1-Sensor Veg-TC-D1-Sensor Veg-TC-D1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-E1-Sensor Veg-TC-E1-Sensor Veg-TC-E1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
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Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-F1-Sensor Veg-TC-F1-Sensor Veg-TC-F1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-G1-Sensor Veg-TC-G1-Sensor Veg-TC-G1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Veg-TC-H1-Sensor Veg-TC-H1-Sensor Veg-TC-H1-Sensor, 
24VDC-Power, 
Wireless-Data, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Environmental Control and Monitoring 
 
TEAMS Module Failure Mode Failure Signals 
Cabin CoolingFailure Heat 
dP-A1-Sensor dP-A1-Sensor-Failure dP-A1-Sensor 
dP-A2-Sensor dP-A2-Sensor-Failure dP-A2-Sensor 
dP-B1-Sensor dP-B1-Sensor-Failure dP-B1-Sensor 
dP-B2-Sensor dP-B2-Sensor-Failure dP-B2-Sensor 
dP-C1-Sensor dP-C1-Sensor-Failure dP-C1-Sensor 
dP-C2-Sensor dP-C2-Sensor-Failure dP-C2-Sensor 
dP-D1-Sensor dP-D1-Sensor-Failure dP-D1-Sensor 
dP-E1-Sensor dP-E1-Sensor-Failure dP-E1-Sensor 
dP-F1-Sensor dP-F1-Sensor-Failure dP-F1-Sensor 
dP-G1-Sensor dP-G1-Sensor-Failure dP-G1-Sensor 
ExTC-A1-Sensor ExTC-A1-Sensor-Failure ExTC-A1-Sensor 
ExTC-B1-Sensor ExTC-B1-Sensor-Failure ExTC-B1-Sensor 
ExTC-C1-Sensor ExTC-C1-Sensor-Failure ExTC-C1-Sensor 
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ExTC-D1-Sensor ExTC-D1-Sensor-Failure ExTC-D1-Sensor 
ExTC-E1-Sensor ExTC-E1-Sensor-Failure ExTC-E1-Sensor 
ExTC-G1-Sensor ExTC-G1-Sensor-Failure ExTC-G1-Sensor 
ExTC-H1-Sensor ExTC-H1-Sensor-Failure ExTC-H1-Sensor 
HeatPump HeatPumpFailure 
Heat 
HeatPumpFailure 
Power 
Hum-Hyg-1-Sensor Hum-Hyg-1-Sensor-Failure Hum-Hyg-1-Sensor 
Hum-TC-Hyg-1-Sensor Hum-TC-Hyg-1-Sensor-Failure Hum-TC-Hyg-1-Sensor 
Hum-TC-Xhab-1-Sensor Hum-TC-Xhab-1-Sensor-Failure Hum-TC-Xhab-1-Sensor 
Hum-Temp-B1-Sensor Hum-Temp-B1-Sensor-Failure Hum-Temp-B1-Sensor 
Hum-Temp-C1-Sensor Hum-Temp-C1-Sensor-Failure Hum-Temp-C1-Sensor 
Hum-Temp-D1-Sensor Hum-Temp-D1-Sensor-Failure Hum-Temp-D1-Sensor 
Hum-Xhab-1-Sensor Hum-Xhab-1-Sensor-Failure Hum-Xhab-1-Sensor 
SEGA Obstruction_SEGA Heat 
SEGB Obstruction_SEGB Heat 
SEGC Obstruction_SEGC Heat 
SEGD Obstruction_SEGD 
Data 
Heat 
Obstruction_SEGD 
Power 
SEGE Obstruction_SEGE 
Data 
Heat 
Obstruction_SEGE 
Power 
SEGF Obstruction_SEGF Heat 
SEGG Obstruction_SEGG Heat 
SEGH Obstruction_SEGH Heat 
SubfloorInlet InletObstruction Heat 
TC-A1-Sensor TC-A1-Sensor-Failure TC-A1-Sensor 
TC-A2-Sensor TC-a2-Sensor-Failure TC-A2-Sensor 
TC-A3-Sensor TC-A3-Sensor-Failure TC-A3-Sensor 
TC-A4-Sensor TC-A4-Sensor-Failure TC-A4-Sensor 
TC-A5-Sensor TC-A5-Sensor-Failure TC-A5-Sensor 
TC-A-L-2-Sensor TC-A-L-2-Sensor-Failure TC-A-L-2-Sensor 
TC-A-L-3-Sensor TC-A-L-3-Sensor-Failure TC-A-L-3-Sensor 
TC-B1-Sensor TC-B1-Sensor-Failure TC-B1-Sensor 
TC-B2-Sensor TC-B2-Sensor-Failure TC-B2-Sensor 
TC-C1-Sensor TC-C1-Sensor-Failure TC-C1-Sensor 
TC-C2-Sensor TC-C2-Sensor-Failure TC-C2-Sensor 
TC-C3-Sensor TC-C3-Sensor-Failure TC-C3-Sensor 
TC-C4-Sensor TC-C4-Sensor-Failure TC-C4-Sensor 
TC-D1-Sensor TC-D1-Sensor-Failure TC-D1-Sensor 
TC-D2-Sensor TC-D2-Sensor-Failure TC-D2-Sensor 
TC-Dust-G5-Sensor TC-Dust-G5-Sensor-Failure TC-Dust-G5-Sensor 
TC-E1-Sensor TC-E1-Sensor-Failure TC-E1-Sensor 
TC-E2-Sensor TC-E2-Sensor-Failure TC-E2-Sensor 
TC-E3-Sensor TC-E3-Sensor-Failure TC-E3-Sensor 
TC-E4-Sensor TC-E4-Sensor-Failure TC-E4-Sensor 
TC-E5-Sensor TC-E5-Sensor-Failure TC-E5-Sensor 
TC-F1-Sensor TC-F1-Sensor-Failure TC-F1-Sensor 
TC-F2-Sensor TC-F2-Sensor-Failure TC-F2-Sensor 
TC-G1-Sensor TC-G1-Sensor-Failure TC-G1-Sensor 
TC-G2-Sensor TC-G2-Sensor-Failure TC-G2-Sensor 
TC-G3-Sensor TC-G3-Sensor-Failure TC-G3-Sensor 
TC-G4-Sensor TC-G4-Sensor-Failure TC-G4-Sensor 
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TEAMS Testpoint TEAMS Test Failure Signals 
CabinTempTest CabinTempTest Heat 
SEGASubfloorTempTest1 SEGASubfloorTempTest1 Heat 
SEGASubfloorTempTest2 SEGASubfloorTempTest2 Heat 
SEGBSubfloorTempTest1 SEGBSubfloorTempTest1 Heat 
SEGBSubfloorTempTest2 SEGBSubfloorTempTest2 Heat 
SEGDSubfloorTempTest1 SEGDSubfloorTempTest1 Heat 
SEGDSubfloorTempTest2 SEGDSubfloorTempTest2 Heat 
SEGESubfloorTempTest1 SEGESubfloorTempTest1 Heat 
SEGESubfloorTempTest2 SEGESubfloorTempTest2 Heat 
SEGFSubfloorTempTest1 SEGFSubfloorTempTest1 Heat 
SEGFSubfloorTempTest2 SEGFSubfloorTempTest2 Heat 
SEGGSubfloorTempTest1 SEGGSubfloorTempTest1 Heat 
SEGGSubfloorTempTest2 SEGGSubfloorTempTest2 Heat 
SEGGSubfloorTempTest3 SEGGSubfloorTempTest3 Heat 
SubfloorDuctInletFlowRateTest SubfloorDuctInletFlowRateTest Heat 
SubfloorDuctInletTempTest SubfloorDuctInletTempTest Heat 
TC-G5-Sensor TC-G5-Sensor-Failure TC-G5-Sensor 
TC-H1-Sensor TC-H1-Sensor-Failure TC-H1-Sensor 
TC-H2-Sensor TC-H2-Sensor-Failure TC-H2-Sensor 
TC-Hyg-1-Sensor TC-Hyg-1-Sensor-Failure TC-Hyg-1-Sensor 
TC-Hyg-2-Sensor TC-Hyg-2-Sensor-Failure TC-Hyg-2-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-1-Sensor TC-Xhab-1-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-1-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-2-Sensor TC-Xhab-2-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-2-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-3-Sensor TC-Xhab-3-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-3-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-4-Sensor TC-Xhab-4-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-4-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-5-Sensor TC-Xhab-5-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-5-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-6-Sensor TC-Xhab-6-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-6-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-7-Sensor TC-Xhab-7-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-7-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-8-Sensor TC-Xhab-8-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-8-Sensor 
TC-Xhab-9-Sensor TC-Xhab-9-Sensor-Failure TC-Xhab-9-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-A1-Sensor Veg-Hum-A1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-A1-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-C1-Sensor Veg-Hum-C1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-C1-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-E1-Sensor Veg-Hum-E1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-E1-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-G1-Sensor Veg-Hum-G1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-G1-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-TC-A1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-A1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-TC-A1-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-TC-C1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-C1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-TC-C1-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-TC-E1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-E1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-TC-E1-Sensor 
Veg-Hum-TC-G1-Sensor Veg-Hum-TC-G1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Hum-TC-G1-Sensor 
Veg-Photo-A1-Sensor Veg-Photo-A1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Photo-A1-Sensor 
Veg-Photo-C1-Sensor Veg-Photo-C1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Photo-C1-Sensor 
Veg-Photo-E1-Sensor Veg-Photo-E1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Photo-E1-Sensor 
Veg-Photo-G1-Sensor Veg-Photo-G1-Sensor-Failure Veg-Photo-G1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-A1-Sensor Veg-TC-A1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-A1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-B1-Sensor Veg-TC-B1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-B1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-C1-Sensor Veg-TC-C1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-C1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-D1-Sensor Veg-TC-D1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-D1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-E1-Sensor Veg-TC-E1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-E1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-F1-Sensor Veg-TC-F1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-F1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-G1-Sensor Veg-TC-G1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-G1-Sensor 
Veg-TC-H1-Sensor Veg-TC-H1-Sensor-Failure Veg-TC-H1-Sensor 
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Figure 17: Crew Accommodations 
 
TEAMS Module Failure Mode Failure Signals 
Airlock-CO2-Sensor Airlock-CO2-Sensor-failure Airlock-CO2 
CrewAccomodations BlockedDuct Heat 
GMWS-Hoist GMWS-Hoist-failure GMWS-Hoist-Out 
GMWS-PowerStrip1 GMWS-PowerStrip1-failure GMWS-PowerStrip1-Out 
HIMS-Display HIMS-Display-failure HIMS-Display-Out 
Hygiene-CO2-Sensor Hygiene-CO2-Sensor-failure Hygiene-CO2 
Internal-Outlet Internal-Outlet-failure Internal-Outlet-Out 
O2-Airlock-Sensor O2-Airlock-Sensor-failure O2-Airlock 
O2-B1-Sensor O2-B1-Sensor-failure O2-B1 
Spot-B Spot-B-failure Spot-B-Out 
Spot-D Spot-D-failure Spot-D-Out 
Spot-F Spot-F-failure Spot-F-Out 
Spot-H Spot-H-failure Spot-H-Out 
SSLM1 SSLM1-failure 
no-light 
no-light-SSLM1 
SSLM2 SSLM2-failure 
no-light 
no-light-SSLM2 
SSLM3 SSLM3-failure 
no-light 
no-light-SSLM3 
SSLM4 SSLM4-failure 
no-light 
no-light-SSLM4 
SSLM5 SSLM5-failure no-light 
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TEAMS Testpoint TEAMS Test Failure Signals 
Command-check-Test Lights-commanded-on-ok command-is-off, 
Command-check-Test Light-Command-Response-Test light-command, 
Dimmer-Switch-Test Dimmer-Switch-is-bright-ok unintended-dimming-command, 
GMWS-Hoist-Check GMWS-Hoist-Check GMWS-Hoist-Out, 
Power, 
GMWS-PowerStrip1-Check GMWS-PowerStrip1-Check GMWS-PowerStrip1-Out, 
Power, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM1-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM2-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM3-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM4-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM5-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM6-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM7-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
Green-LED-Test Power-to-SSLM8-ok 120DC-Power, 
PDU2Failure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
HabitatTempTest HabitatTempTest Heat, 
HIMS-Display-Check HIMS-Display-Check HIMS-Display-Out, 
Power, 
Internal-Outlet-Check Internal-Outlet-Check Internal-Outlet-Out, 
Power, 
no-light-SSLM5 
SSLM6 SSLM6-failure 
no-light 
no-light-SSLM6 
SSLM7 SSLM7-failure 
no-light 
no-light-SSLM7 
SSLM8 SSLM8-failure 
no-light 
no-light-SSLM8 
Task-Light Task-Light-failure Task-Light-Out 
Trash-Compactor Trash-Compactor-failure Trash-Compactor-Out 
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Manual-Switch-Test Manual-Switch-is-on-ok unintended-manual-off-command, 
Multiple-Lights-Out Multiple-Lights-Out unintended-dimming-command, 
unintended-manual-off-command, 
no-light, 
command-is-off, 
CDHSwitchFailure, 
PDUFailure, 
Obstruction_SEGD, 
Obstruction_SEGE, 
HeatPumpFailure, 
SourceFailure, 
JunctionBoxFailure, 
PDU2Failure, 
ACDCFailure, 
Unintended-External-Power-Switch-
Deactivation, 
PDU2-Bank1-Failure, 
PDU2-Bank2-Failure, 
One-Light-Out One-Light-Off unintended-dimming-command, 
unintended-manual-off-command, 
command-is-off, 
no-light-SSLM1, 
no-light-SSLM2, 
no-light-SSLM4, 
no-light-SSLM3, 
no-light-SSLM5, 
no-light-SSLM6, 
no-light-SSLM7, 
no-light-SSLM8, 
Spot-B-Check Spot-B-Check Spot-B-Out, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Spot-D-Check Spot-D-Check Spot-D-Out, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Spot-F-Check Spot-F-Check Spot-F-Out, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Spot-H-Check Spot-H-Check Spot-H-Out, 
B1-28VDC-Power, 
Task-Light-Check Task-Light-Check Task-Light-Out, 
Power, 
Trash-Compactor-Check Trash-Compactor-Check Trash-Compactor-Out, 
Power, 
 
 
Failure Scenarios 
 
The ACAWS team identified four demonstration scenarios consisting of failure injection, failure diagnosis 
and failure recovery.  The D-matrices for Scenario 2 (24 Volt Direct Current (VDC) Power Supply Failure) 
are shown below. The first D-matrix shows the diagnosis without manual tests (check 24 VDC Power 
Supply LED Light, while the second D-matrix shows the diagnosis with manual tests (see Figure 18). 
Without manual tests, the diagnosis cannot be narrowed to the 24 VDC power supply and is one of the 
suspects (yellow rows); with manual tests, however, the diagnosis identifies the fault (see top red row, 
Figure 19). 
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Figure 18: In scenario 2, 24 VDC Power Supply cannot be isolated as the fault without manual 
observation (test result). Red arrow points to that component in the suspect list. 
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Figure 19: In Scenario 2, failure is correctly isolated to 24 VDC Power Supply using manual 
observation procedure “Check 24 VDC LED light” (see arrows in diagram). 
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